

COOPERATION OR CONFLICT: THE INTERACTION OF U.S. MILITARY
FORCES AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN
MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

LINDSEY E. ARNOLD, CHAPLAIN (MAJ), USA
B.A., Seattle Pacific University, Seattle, Washington, 1978
M. Div., Princeton Theological Seminary,
Princeton, New Jersey, 1982

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1996

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

19960820 029

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE 7 June 1996	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis, 31 July 95-7 June 96	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Cooperation or Conflict: The Interaction of U.S. Military Forces and Nongovernmental Organizations in Military Operations Other Than War			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Chaplain (Major) Lindsey E. Arnold, U.S. Army				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD, 1 Reynolds Avenue Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES				
DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED				
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) This study explores the interaction between U.S. military forces and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in military operations other than war (MOOTW). The thesis is that some problems identified in this interaction can be traced to the nature of both the military and NGOs as value-based institutions. Successful interaction between the military and NGOs is critical. The military has developed doctrinal guidelines to minimize points of contention. This study emphasizes the importance of understanding the values, perspectives, and organizational culture of NGOs when developing such guidelines for interaction. This study acknowledges the value of the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) as a means for orchestrating unity of effort between the military and NGOs. It proposes adding certain specialized functions and training for CMOC staffs. It also maintains that formal, systematic consideration of NGO perspectives is an equally key part of future attempts to improve military performance in this area.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Nongovernmental Organizations, Military Operations Other Than War			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 110	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Unlimited	

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING SF 298

The Report Documentation Page (RDP) is used in announcing and cataloging reports. It is important that this information be consistent with the rest of the report, particularly the cover and title page. Instructions for filling in each block of the form follow. It is important to *stay within the lines* to meet optical scanning requirements.

Block 1. Agency Use Only (Leave blank).

Block 2. Report Date. Full publication date including day, month, and year, if available (e.g. 1 Jan 88). Must cite at least the year.

Block 3. Type of Report and Dates Covered. State whether report is interim, final, etc. If applicable, enter inclusive report dates (e.g. 10 Jun 87 - 30 Jun 88).

Block 4. Title and Subtitle. A title is taken from the part of the report that provides the most meaningful and complete information. When a report is prepared in more than one volume, repeat the primary title, add volume number, and include subtitle for the specific volume. On classified documents enter the title classification in parentheses.

Block 5. Funding Numbers. To include contract and grant numbers; may include program element number(s), project number(s), task number(s), and work unit number(s). Use the following labels:

C - Contract	PR - Project
G - Grant	TA - Task
PE - Program Element	WU - Work Unit Accession No.

Block 6. Author(s). Name(s) of person(s) responsible for writing the report, performing the research, or credited with the content of the report. If editor or compiler, this should follow the name(s).

Block 7. Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es). Self-explanatory.

Block 8. Performing Organization Report Number. Enter the unique alphanumeric report number(s) assigned by the organization performing the report.

Block 9. Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Name(s) and Address(es). Self-explanatory.

Block 10. Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Report Number. (If known)

Block 11. Supplementary Notes. Enter information not included elsewhere such as: Prepared in cooperation with...; Trans. of...; To be published in.... When a report is revised, include a statement whether the new report supersedes or supplements the older report.

Block 12a. Distribution/Availability Statement. Denotes public availability or limitations. Cite any availability to the public. Enter additional limitations or special markings in all capitals (e.g. NOFORN, REL, ITAR).

DOD - See DoDD 5230.24, "Distribution Statements on Technical Documents."

DOE - See authorities.

NASA - See Handbook NHB 2200.2.

NTIS - Leave blank.

Block 12b. Distribution Code.

DOD - Leave blank.

DOE - Enter DOE distribution categories from the Standard Distribution for Unclassified Scientific and Technical Reports.

NASA - Leave blank.

NTIS - Leave blank.

Block 13. Abstract. Include a brief (*Maximum 200 words*) factual summary of the most significant information contained in the report.

Block 14. Subject Terms. Keywords or phrases identifying major subjects in the report.

Block 15. Number of Pages. Enter the total number of pages.

Block 16. Price Code. Enter appropriate price code (*NTIS only*).

Blocks 17. - 19. Security Classifications. Self-explanatory. Enter U.S. Security Classification in accordance with U.S. Security Regulations (i.e., UNCLASSIFIED). If form contains classified information, stamp classification on the top and bottom of the page.

Block 20. Limitation of Abstract. This block must be completed to assign a limitation to the abstract. Enter either UL (unlimited) or SAR (same as report). An entry in this block is necessary if the abstract is to be limited. If blank, the abstract is assumed to be unlimited.

COOPERATION OR CONFLICT: THE INTERACTION OF U.S. MILITARY
FORCES AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN
MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

LINDSEY E. ARNOLD, CHAPLAIN (MAJ), USA
B.A., Seattle Pacific University, Seattle, Washington, 1978
M. Div., Princeton Theological Seminary,
Princeton, New Jersey, 1982

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1996

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE


THESIS APPROVAL PAGE


Name of Candidate: Chaplain (MAJ) Lindsey E. Arnold

Thesis Title: Cooperation or Conflict: The Interaction of U.S.
Military Forces and Nongovernmental Organizations in Military Operations
Other Than War


Approved by:

 _____, Thesis Committee Chairman
Chaplain (LTC) Edward K. Maney, M.Div.

 _____, Member
LTC Jose L. Vazquez, M.S.

 _____, Member, Consulting Faculty
MAJ Michael R. Payne, Ph.D.

Accepted this 7th day of June 1996 by:

 _____, Director, Graduate Degree
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student
author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency.
(References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

COOPERATION OR CONFLICT: THE INTERACTION OF U.S. MILITARY FORCES
AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER
THAN WAR by Chaplain (MAJ) Lindsey E. Arnold, USA, 110 pages.

This study explores the interaction between U.S. military forces and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in military operations other than war (MOOTW). The thesis is that some problems identified in this interaction during recent MOOTWs can be traced to the nature of both the military and NGOs as values-based institutions.

Successful interaction between the military and NGOs has been defined as key to the success of MOOTWs. The military has developed doctrinal guidelines to minimize some of the organizational points of contention. This study emphasizes the importance of understanding the perspectives, values, and the organizational culture of NGOs when developing doctrinal guidelines for interaction.

This study acknowledges the value of the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) concept as a means for orchestrating unity of effort between the military and NGOs. It proposes expansion of the CMOC to include additional specialized functions as well as additional training for CMOC staffs. It also maintains that formal, systematic consideration of NGO perspectives is an equally key part of future attempts to improve military performance in this area.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
APPROVAL PAGE.....	ii
ABSTRACT.....	iii
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE.....	16
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.....	41
4. THE MILITARY AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: ORGANI- ZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS.....	46
5. NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION AND MILITARY INTERACTION IN SOMALIA.....	68
6. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH.....	86
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	104
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST.....	110

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Shortly after the year 1099 a group of Crusaders, healing from their battle wounds in a hospital in Jerusalem, came to believe that the sick, poor, and injured were literally God's body on earth and must be cared for. Their fervor led to the founding of a new religious order, the Knights of Malta, whose mission was not only to defend the Christian faith, but to tend to the sick, the hungry, the injured, and the helpless.¹ This order, founded nearly 900 years ago, was one of the first of many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) which have given comfort and aid on and off the battlefield to the victims of war and natural disasters.

Background and Context of the Problem

Today hundreds of NGOs (including the still-active but no longer militant Knights of Malta) work in almost every country of the world. They range from small groups of self-supporting, volunteer workers to organizations whose structures rival those of small nations. Their missions range from handing out food directly to the hungry to developing regional or national infrastructure for long term development or restoration of entire economies.

Many NGOs have goals that do not even fall within the general rubric of relief. The selfless (and often dangerous) mission of the

CounterMine group, whose work focuses on removing unexploded mines from areas of past conflicts, is just one of countless examples.

There are, literally, hundreds of NGOs throughout the world. Many have roots in religious communities, others do not. Some are fairly closely connected to national governments, others explicitly shun such affiliation. Characterizations of NGOs as organizations primarily based in the United States are incorrect. Most nations have NGOs with the capability to operate internally (even in Somalia there were local Somali NGOs operating during OPERATION RESTORE HOPE²). Europe, in particular, is home to a great number of NGOs, based in western European nations but operating throughout the entire world.

NGOs are important, highly visible players with a significant influence in certain aspects of the world scene. The efforts of relief-oriented NGOs, in particular, have gained widespread recognition and approval within the international community. The respect afforded internationally to groups, such as Food for the Hungry and *Medicins sans Frontiers* (to name just two examples), illustrate this clearly.

Relief-oriented NGOs have a formal relationship to the United Nations, embodied in their consultative status with the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Assistance (UNDHA).³ In the United States their formal relationship with the government is usually through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for domestic activities and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) for activities outside of the United States.⁴ In Europe the ongoing role of NGOs has been formally sanctioned by both NATO and the Conference on Security and

Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in their Charter of Paris for a New Europe.⁵

Certain nonrelief NGOs have also gained significant international influence. Amnesty International is, perhaps, the most widely known of these organizations, at least in the United States.

The United States, as a nation, has adopted humanitarian assistance as one of the essential goals of its national military strategy.⁶ The armed forces support this strategic goal primarily by engaging in efforts which are currently being termed military operations other than war (MOOTW).⁷ Within MOOTW a major subcategory of operations is categorized under the doctrinal term of humanitarian assistance (HA). The approval and publication of the recent interservice manual Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations, approved by the U.S. Army as Field Manual 100-23-2, underscores the thinking and importance of HA operations in current military planning.⁸

NGOs, oriented towards situations caused by either man-made conflict or natural disaster, will in all likelihood be present in any future MOOTWs. This alone makes them a factor to consider in military planning.

Their actual importance, however, may be based on a far wider range of reasons than simply their existence in a given military area of operations. NGOs often play vital humanitarian assistance roles in areas where they operate. They know the key players and the operational environment and often have established a high degree of credibility with the local populace.

The United States often wishes to limit its own military involvement (particularly in terms of time) in HA interventions. NGOs, therefore, may actually be (or become) the center of the mission itself, as the means by which the U.S. limits its own military commitment while ensuring that HA efforts continue. This was true, for example, in OPERATION RESTORE HOPE. The stated mission for that operation was:

When directed by the NCA, USCINCCENT will conduct joint/combined military operations in Somalia to secure the major air and sea ports, key installations and food distribution points, to provide open and free passage of relief supplies, provide security for convoys and relief organization operations, and assist UN/NGO's in providing humanitarian relief under U.N. auspices.⁹

NGOs are also important to the political aspects of MOOTWs. They often have reporting structures apart from (and not under the control of) military or governmental sources. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), to cite just one instance, even has its own secure communications network.¹⁰ Although the ICRC's extensive capability in this regard is perhaps unique, other NGOs routinely establish and maintain communication and reporting channels of their own.

Parallel to this is the almost-automatic access NGOs have to the mass media. NGOs, particularly those who use private donations as their major source of funding, have a definite need to communicate. The press and mass media have a need for good stories, and television, above all, has an insatiable need for good visual footage. The direct action approach of many relief organizations often provides an opportunity for all of these needs to be satisfied by one event. Media relations will be addressed in more depth later in this study. For now it is important

only to note that understanding this factor is a critical aspect in the wider issue of understanding military and NGO interaction.

There has been, as already noted, a significant growth of interest in the capabilities of NGOs in military circles in the last ten years. The widespread presence of NGOs in OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT is one reason for this (although the military had been involved with relief NGOs just before that operation when the U.S. Navy carried out OPERATION SEA ANGEL, assisting NGOs who were responding to the devastating 1991 hurricane in Bangladesh). The central role that NGOs played in Somalia, however, seems to have crystallized the interest even more.

This recent growth in the importance of NGOs has not only caused a corresponding growth in the interest of the U.S. and other militaries about their capabilities, but also in the dynamics of interaction between the two entities. The reasons for this enhanced interest have already been noted: the criticality of NGOs in HA situations, their political significance, and their interaction with the media. Recent instances where the U.S. military and NGOs have worked in the same area of operations include not only the aforementioned OPERATION SEA ANGEL, OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT, and OPERATION RESTORE HOPE, but also OPERATION SUPPORT HOPE in Rwanda, OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti, current operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Joint Task Force (JTF) Hurricane Andrew relief mission in the United States itself.

At this time the doctrinal response by the military to the presence of NGOs in areas of military operations has focused on the idea of unity of effort. This concept takes for granted that actual command and control of NGOs by the military is probably not going to happen, but

that the military and NGOs will still have to work together in HA situations. Unity of effort, therefore, will insure that the mission is accomplished.

U.S. military doctrinal development in this area has culminated with the adoption of the already cited Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations. Other doctrinal publications also address selected aspects of NGO and military interaction. FM 100-23-2 is, however, the capstone document which pulls together other references and comprehensively addresses the complexities involved in military and NGO interface.

The Research Question

Given the criticality of this interaction, however, and the growing interest of many NGOs themselves in this issue, further analysis is clearly in order. Major John M. Metz, U.S. Army, writing at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC) on command and control issues in HA missions, characterizes NGOs as part of the military force's "external environment." He then echoes the current military concept of unity of effort, making point that, in the final analysis, a "joint task force's success depends on unity of effort between itself and the external environment."¹¹

The purpose of this paper is to engage in a further analysis of these issues by addressing the following research question: What is the nature of the interaction between the military and NGOs in MOOTW?

Subordinate questions concern current military doctrine in this area. Does current doctrine adequately address problems brought out in

the after-action reports (AARs) of recent MOOTW operations? Does it genuinely acknowledge the existence and interests of the NGOs as separate players in HA situations who ultimately are independent of military authority? Does it take into account differing organizational perspectives, cultural attitudes, and value systems of NGOs and military forces?

If the answers to any or all of the above questions are not positive, then what changes could the U.S. military make in their current doctrine which would enhance the relations between the military and NGOs in HA or MOOTW environments?

Assumptions

Two assumptions are necessary to this study. The first is that the National Command Authority will continue to direct military involvement in MOOTW environments. If this is not true then there is no significance, except historical, to this study and the rationale for investigating the subject is invalid.

The second assumption is that international law will not change and give the military commander in a MOOTW environment directive power over the NGOs (or their resources) in the area of operations. Were that to be true, and the military commander given the power to direct NGOs, then most of the factors addressed in this study would cease to be relevant. Although new factors would undoubtedly arise, they probably would fall into the area of pure speculation and in any case cannot be addressed within the methodology of this study. Further examination of

this issue, however, may be pursued through studies by legal scholars specializing in international law.

Definition of Terms

One unfortunate, but perhaps inevitable, consequence of this growth of interest has been a proliferation of terminology. Nongovernmental Organization (NGO), Private Volunteer Organization (PVO), Humanitarian Assistance Organization (HAO), Human Relief Organization (HRO); these are but a few of the names used to describe and differentiate between types of organizations, other than those which have been formally established by the governments of sovereign national states, involved in humanitarian efforts.

The most current military doctrine uses three terms. NGOs are defined as predominantly European, nonprofit, voluntary organizations. PVOs are private, nonprofit humanitarian organizations based in the U.S.. International Organizations (IOs) are organizations with global influence, such as the Red Cross and the United Nations.¹²

These distinctions are vague at best, misleading at worst. An earlier writer in this area remarked that, "Characteristics of PVOs and NGOs blur into similarity; the distinction is being dropped from the literature in preference of NGOs."¹³ Would that this were so!

This author will follow his lead, and that of Major Thomas Pope, USA, who when writing at the USACGSC chose to solely use "NGO" rather than alternating between other possible terms.¹⁴ If, for the sake of clarity or argument, further delineation of the mission or function of a particular NGO is necessary, the author will address that issue by

verbal description rather than attempting to continually distinguish multiple subtypes of NGOs by using additional acronyms.

This author, furthermore, views the United Nations as an established governmental organization whose field agencies do not share the primary characteristics of the other types of groups being addressed here. Consequently references to the U.N. or its agencies will be clearly and separately noted throughout this work. The only exception to this will be in chapter 5. In that chapter the writings of the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) are continually referenced. The CNA normally uses the term Humanitarian Relief Organization (HRO) to include all relief agencies, governmental, nongovernmental, and U.N. agencies.

Limitations

There are two limitations to this study, both involving NGOs themselves. The first primarily relates to the major case study, OPERATION RESTORE HOPE in Somalia. There is no comprehensive list of NGOs involved. This is because there is no requirement (at any level) for NGOs to "register" with any central body. Furthermore, the semi-anarchy of that situation mitigated against even the most routine of recordkeeping on the part of Somali authorities. Therefore the author is limited to dealing only with those NGOs listed by name in various after-action documents or other sources, none of which claim to be exhaustive.

The second limitation is that NGOs have varying degrees of recordkeeping and varying degrees of willingness to cooperate with a study done in a military institution. This study is limited to

consideration of the materials which NGOs are willing to share, or which can be obtained through academic channels or other open sources.

Delimitations

The author has chosen to delimit this study in five areas. The first is that in the case study only NGOs cited by name in military documents will be used. The rationale is that the nature of the interaction between NGOs and the military is being examined, rather than the work of NGOs themselves. There may have been NGOs who did superb work with minimal or no contact with military authorities. Their work, however, is not the subject of this study. Using military documents as a starting place will limit this study to those organizations known to have had interaction with the military.

The second delimitation is that this study will examine only one MOOTW situation in depth, OPERATION RESTORE HOPE in Somalia. The rationale for this involves both the scope of that operation and the appropriate length of this study. OPERATION RESTORE HOPE was large enough to test almost all aspects of military interaction under varying levels of threat and complexity. No other recent MOOTW replicates this. Full-blown case studies of additional MOOTWs would have added significant length to this study with little additional value.

The third delimitation is that consideration of experiences between the military and NGOs in operations within the United States is excluded. The rationale is that within the United States both the military and NGOs are ultimately subject to the same authority--the law of the land as it were. This directly bears on matters of command and

control and where authority ultimately lies. It may be that recommendations to improve the interaction between the military and NGOs may be applicable to operations in the United States, but those operations should not be the basis for developing such recommendations.

The fourth delimitation is that of time. This study deals only in materials available prior to November 1995. As this study is finished, U.S. forces are engaged in a major operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There is significant military and NGO interaction in this operation and a major Civil-Military Operations Cell (CMOC) has been set up in the Bosnian city of Tuzla. However, this study, like any study, cannot be completed without cutting off input at some specified time. The rationale for November 1995 is that the first draft was due at that time.

The final delimitation is that the recommendations in this study will be directed only towards the military community and not to NGOs. This is not to imply that there is no room for improvement on both sides, there undoubtedly is. This study, however, is authored by a military officer within a military institution and is intended for a primarily military audience. Changing the entire world is a commendable goal; trying to influence the particular organization with which one is affiliated is also commendable, as well as more practical. Should this study circulate beyond the military it will hopefully serve as a vehicle for understanding by all players--military and civilian--in the worthy endeavor of helping those caught up in either manmade or natural disasters who are in the most critical need.

Significance of the Study

A significant aspect of this particular study is the author's attempt to incorporate a crucial piece which is missing or minimized in other studies currently circulating within the military community: the writings, doctrine, values, and perspectives of the NGOs themselves. Their omission is critically significant for at least three reasons.

The first is that, although the existence of NGOs as independent players in the HA environment is readily acknowledged and continually discussed in almost every official and scholarly consideration of this subject, there seems to have been little attempt to use the source documents of these organizations when military doctrine was developed. It is this author's conclusion that this has led to shortfalls in understanding the impact of their values and perspectives.

The second reason follows from the first. These shortfalls are not only matters of academic completeness and accuracy. They lead to an incomplete understanding of how NGOs see themselves and their basic role in HA situations. The military's incomplete understanding could seriously affect attempts to work constructively with NGOs in HA or other MOOTW situations.

The third reason is that these NGO perspectives can provide the military with a "reality check" for future changes (or, in the case of this study, recommendations for change) in doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Most of the doctrinal innovations in this area cannot be objectively tested in advance by computer simulation or other formal, quantitative scientific methods (see chapter 3, "Research

Methodology"). While training involving both the military and NGO representatives does occur, there is a substantial difference between even the best training exercise and reality on the ground. Doctrine can never supplant reality or hope to cover every facet or possible complication in a "real world" situation. Doctrine which does not fully take into account the roles, perspectives, and values of every player, however, is far less likely to be effective than doctrine which attempts to do so.

The military must continue work to refine, analyze, and improve its interaction with NGOs because the American public demands that they work together. The military often perceives the differences between NGOs and itself to be extremely significant. This perception may very well be true. To the American public, however, these differences are not so obvious. The military and NGOs are both seen by them as positive institutions. NGOs personify the values of charity and altruism. The military exemplifies selfless service and America's commitment to "making things work and getting the job done" even in the most difficult and varied missions and settings.

The goal of this study is to contribute to the military's ability to help the helpless. This is, in the final analysis, what HAOs are all about. They are vitally important not only because they are legal missions assigned by the National Command Authority but because they stop innocent people from dying.

The interaction between the military and NGOs has been clearly identified as critical to the success of HAOs. Military doctrine serves as the basis for the military side of that interaction. To provide

analysis and recommendations to improve that doctrine, therefore, is ultimately going to contribute to the success of missions which are vital not only politically and strategically, but morally as well.

The will of the American people, expressed through the formal security and military strategies adopted by their elected civilian leadership, has told the military clearly that continued involvement with NGOs is expected. The military has, therefore, both legal and moral obligations in this area: to develop doctrine which will enable the fulfillment of those obligations in the most effective way possible.

Endnotes

¹The New Encyclopedia Britannica 15th ed., s.v. "Knights of St. John of the Cross."

²Jonathan T. Dworken, Military Relations with Humanitarian Relief Organizations: Observations from Restore Hope (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, 1993), Table 1, 14.

³Global Humanitarian Emergencies, 1995 (New York: United States Mission to the United Nations, 1995), 11.

⁴Thomas G. Pope, "Beans, Bullets, and Band-Aids: Attaining Unity of Effort in Humanitarian Intervention Operations" (School of Advanced Military Studies monograph, USACGSC, 1994), 10.

⁵Hans G. Brauch and Robert Kennedy, eds., Alternative Conventional Defense Postures in the European Theater, vol. 3 (Washington, DC: Crane Russak, 1993), 289.

⁶National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 1995 (Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995), 9.

⁷The term MOOTW is doctrinally correct at this time. Consideration is now being given, however, to replacing MOOTW simply by the term "Other Operations."

⁸FM 100-23-2, Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations Final Draft (Fort Monroe, VA: Air, Land, Sea Applications Center, 1994), 1.

⁹Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operation: Lessons Learned (Fort McNair, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), 16.

¹⁰This author became personally acquainted with this capability of the ICRC while serving as a chaplain during DESERT STORM.

¹¹John M. Metz, Humanitarian Assistance Operations: A Command and Control Dilemma, (MMAS thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1995), 26-27.

¹²FM 100-23-2, 1-2.

¹³Gary R. Councell, "Chaplain Roles in Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Operations" (monograph, U.S. Army War College, 1994), 23.

¹⁴Pope, chap. 1, passim.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The growth in importance of NGOs, the increase of military interest in them, and their involvement in recent operations has led to a plethora of literature relating to them. Uncertainty as to whether cooperation or conflict has been the predominant characteristic of military and NGO interaction has led the military to address these issues both conceptually (through a significant amount of discussion in military and military-related journals) and authoritatively, through ongoing development of formal doctrine.

Dr. Kevin M. Cahill has edited an extremely significant and helpful book A Framework for Survival: Health, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Assistance in Conflicts and Disasters, which provides an overview and sets the role of NGOs into the overall context of today's international environment.¹ This work strongly emphasizes many positive aspects of NGOs, but acknowledges weaknesses as well, particularly in terms of their logistical limits in large-scale operations. His work presents a balanced and insightful point of departure for the remainder of this literature and consideration of this subject as a whole.

Graham Hancock has a much more jaundiced viewpoint, if not specifically towards NGOs then towards the international aid community as a whole. His 1989 book Lords of Poverty: the Power, Prestige, and

Corruption of the International Aid Business is quite polemic.² It does, however, provide useful insights into the structural formation of international aid initiatives. His explanation of the role that information and publicity play (to include the mass media) is particularly illuminating.

In like fashion Jonathan Benthall's Disasters, Relief, and the Media closely examines the symbiotic relationship between NGOs and the media.³ As a British writer Benthall draws upon examples with which American readers might not be wholly familiar. His insights into the essential needs that the media and NGOs fulfill for each other in crisis situations, however, shed a great deal of light upon an area which is often an extremely sore point for military authorities.

Although direct, on-the-ground interaction between the U.S. military and NGOs may be relatively recent, the interaction between NGOs, policymakers, and the American public is not. Furthermore, although NGOs are currently spending a great deal of energy sorting out their responses to violent situations where even strictly humanitarian aid may be politicized, this is not a totally new problem for them. The actions of the NGOs which operated in the self-proclaimed nation of Biafra during the Nigerian civil war of 1966-1970 led to a situation where the Federal Government of Nigeria not only came to view many NGOs as hostile, but actually shot down at least two relief aircraft, one operated by the German Red Cross and the other by Joint Church Aid, USA.

A trilogy of books lends significant insight into this situation. The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War by Joseph Stremlau explains the international impact of the NGOs' highly

publicized work in Biafra.⁴ Joseph Thompson's American Policy and African Famine: the Nigeria Biafra War, 1966-1970 explores how growing U.S. support of purely humanitarian endeavors brought American policymakers to the point of supporting the losing side in an African civil war.⁵ This support persisted in spite of the fact that no strategic U.S. interests were involved in Biafra and against contentions that this support was doing long-term damage to America's relations with other nations in the region. Finally John De St. Jorre's The Nigerian Civil War does a simply superb job of describing the convoluted processes which inevitably politicized even the most benign attempts by NGOs to assist a people whose need for succor was caused solely by man-made conflict.⁶

The politicization of NGO efforts is not a phenomena limited to the Nigerian-Biafrian conflict. In Is Latin America Turning Protestant? David Stoll describes the interaction between some evangelical religious groups and anti-Communist movements throughout Central and South America.⁷ His contention is that the work of many of these groups, to include World Vision, has been seriously compromised by this involvement. Echoes of these same anti-Communist "players" who manipulate NGOs, interestingly enough, may be found in Anglican-envoy's Terry Waite's autobiographical account of his captivity in Lebanon, Taken on Trust.⁸ This book does not directly deal with the work of NGOs. It does, however, portray accurately the motivation of the type of person who would choose to volunteer for altruistic work in extremely dangerous situations.

It has been several years since humanitarian assistance was formally included in National Military Strategy of the United States. The operational dynamics of these humanitarian assistance operations (HAOs) and other types of operations currently collected under the general rubric of MOOTW are still being examined. Two lawmakers, Henk Vos from Holland and James Bilbray from the United States, define certain aspects of HA and peacekeeping operations in the Reserve Officers' Association's "National Security Report" of June 1995. Their brief article is quite telling, outlining in detail aspects, such as the power and efficacy of the mass media's pressure on governments to "do something," the extremely wide range of activities or operations that have been called "peacekeeping," the difficulties of coordination within these operations, and the certainty that military involvement in these types of operations will continue.⁹

Andrew Natsios, vice-president of World Vision (a major NGO) and writing in The Washington Quarterly, posits that disaster relief (to include response to man-made disasters, such as Somalia) is the most popular form of U.S. foreign assistance--due, again, to the influence of the mass media.¹⁰

Critical of U.N. conduct in Somalia and concerned about both the sovereign integrity of U.S. foreign policy and the effectiveness of the military instrument of power in relief situations, Natsios offers six propositions governing the decision to employ of military forces in such cases. These propositions include clearly defining the mission and end state, early deployment of the military into theater, a surety that military employment will reduce the overall death rate (including deaths

by violence) rather than increasing it, a general international consensus, the ability of the military force to make the decisive difference in the situation, and employment of military power only if the military provides a significant advantage over other relief agencies.

Colonel Ernest Sutton, writing at the Army War College, is also concerned about the role of the military in HAOs. In "The New Role of Humanitarian Assistance in National Military Strategy: How to Make it Work" he attempts to set the role of HA missions in American national defense strategy into the context of forward presence.¹¹ He, like Natsios, sets forth principles guiding employment of military force in these situations.

This study was written before the U.S. deployment to Somalia. Consequently Colonel Sutton writes without the experiences of that specific operation to draw upon. The most illuminating difference, however, between this work and that of Natsios, is that Colonel Sutton (writing from a career military perspective) treats military employment as a "done deal," a decision already made by someone else. His principles, therefore, unlike the propositions of Mr. Natsios, are not related to conditions defining whether military force should be employed, but rather with how those forces should be employed most effectively.¹² Colonel Sutton also does an excellent job of discussing the intricacies of interagency coordination.

Commander William J. Marshall III, USN, writing at the Naval War College in 1993, draws upon both the naval experience of OPERATION SEA ANGEL and the joint experience of OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT to examine

humanitarian assistance operational doctrine.¹³ His somewhat radical conclusion is that it remains the moral obligation of the United States to engage in large-scale HAOs because it alone has the capability to do so.¹⁴ His other conclusions are not too surprising. He emphasizes the need for detailed advance planning, unity of effort, and a concern for clear doctrine (or at least clear operational and planning guidelines). He does maintain that it is the sea services and special operations forces (SOF) who should be the "forces of choice" for HAOs.¹⁵ This contention is not purely based upon service parochialism. He supports it by citing the demonstrated ability of SOF forces to work closely with indigenous peoples in immature theaters and on the capability of Sea Service forces to bring significant seaborne logistics assets quickly forward in HAOs.¹⁶

Issues surrounding coordination and cooperation between the military and NGOs crop up almost immediately in any serious review of this literature. Balbeer K. Sihra's brief article in the March 1994 Marine Corps Gazette, "Relief Agencies and the U.S. Military: Partners in Humanitarian Operations," is typical in many respects, but is exceptionally clear in defining many of the major problem areas. These include lack of doctrine in the area of military and NGO interaction, lack of a defined organizational structure to facilitate this interaction, and lack of advance contact or liaison between the military and NGOs or their representatives.¹⁷

Lieutenant General Daniel Schroeder, USA (Retired) writing in the December 1994 Armed Forces Journal International, draws upon his own experience as the commander of JTF SUPPORT HOPE in Rwanda to examine

joint warfighting doctrine in this type of operation. His conclusion in this brief article is that joint warfighting doctrine was sufficient. The value of his article lies beyond this, in the discussion of the criticality of the "information war," the description of U.S. and U.N. cooperation, and his perspectives on the role of the JTF commander.

From the military perspective the root cause of difficulties in the interaction between the major players in HAOs has been explained differently by various authors. Some see this as only one part of a broader operational (or operational environment) issue. Others view it as strictly (or, in some cases primarily) an organizational or structural issue. Still others see it as a specifically doctrinal issue. There are six substantial works in this area which, often using the major issues identified in case studies of past operations, take all of these viewpoints into account.

The first work is a monograph by Major Carol Clair, USA, "Humanitarian Assistance and the Elements of Operational Design."¹⁸ Writing from the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), Major Clair examines joint warfighting doctrine to determine its applicability to HAOs.

A key point which Major Clair makes is that in HAOs there is no enemy center of gravity to attack, but that timely HA aid provided by NGOs is a friendly center of gravity which must be protected.¹⁹ She also shows how deception operations--a normal part of military operational planning--are often counterproductive in HAOs, that information about NGOs and their capabilities is an important area of

friendly intelligence and that media involvement and relations are critical to the success of the HAO.

Major Clair also explores the use of a Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) by the United Nations in Somalia and of the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) by U.S. forces. The CMOC has become the doctrinal standard in FM 100-23-2, based in no little part on the Somalia experience. She maintains that NGO and military interface is primarily a Civil Affairs function.²⁰

Commander Roger Easton, USN, writing at the Naval War College, also explores aspects of the peacekeeping mission in Somalia. The tone of his title "Somalia: Key Operational Considerations and Implications in an Era of Peace-Enforcement and Forced Humanitarian Assistance Ventures" is no accident.²¹ Highly critical of the United Nations and media, Commander Easton emphasizes the ambiguity of some HAOs, the role of the media and the UN in bringing the US military into them, and the difficulties the on-the-ground commander faces as he "conduct[s] combat operations while attempting to maintain a high moral ground and degree of benevolence."²²

Major Thomas G. Pope, USA, also writing from SAMS, sees the issue as one of obtaining or creating unity of effort in an environment which is changing for both military and civilian players.²³ In "Beans, Bullets, and Band-Aids: Attaining Unity of Effort in Humanitarian Intervention Operations" he describes a military whose operational environment has changed because cooperation is expected with civilian entities which they do not command and with NGOs whose environment has changed because they face increasing numbers of situations where they

are being forced to rely on the military to provide enough security to enable them to fulfill their basic relief charter.

Drawing primarily from the case studies of OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT and OPERATION RESTORE HOPE, Major Pope categorizes the three major groups of participants in HAOs as the donors (private and governmental), the implementers (civilian relief organizations), and the military. Their organizational interplay is what has to be orchestrated to obtain unity of effort.²⁴

Although problems are readily apparent in Major Pope's analysis of the environment (he omits both the "customers" towards whom the relief mission is directed and the threat forces) his monograph makes several critical points. First of all he clearly realizes that the long term commitments of some NGOs in a region may lead to substantial differences in how mission accomplishment is defined by different players in the same HAO. Secondly, he realizes that NGOs themselves will probably have to seriously examine their own values, standards, and operating procedures if unity of effort is to be achieved. Finally, he calls for a significant expansion of the CMOC concept. He keeps Civil Affairs personnel involved, but places the CMOC under the operations officer (S-3, G-3, or J-3) as a key operational activity.²⁵

Command and control is seen as the central dilemma by Major John Metz, USA. His master's thesis at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, "Humanitarian Assistance Operations: a Command and Control Dilemma," examines difficulties in HAOs from the premise that they are primarily a command and control (C2) problem.²⁶

Major Metz's work, the most current of these studies, is extremely well-documented, relying heavily on after-action documents from OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT, OPERATION RESTORE HOPE, and OPERATION SUPPORT HOPE provided by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). He also brings in a wealth of studies on organizational structure and change and the nature of command.

His conclusion is that military commanders are the key to making interaction between the military and NGOs work. In order to accomplish this the military commander must do two things: develop a very detailed understanding of the requirements of the mission early and then structure his organization to meet those requirements.²⁷

The key to understanding Major Metz's thesis is that he sees the problem of NGO and military interaction as primarily an organizational one. What this understanding allows him to do is to take an approach using an existing military organizational concept, the Joint Task Force (JTF), as a basis from which to approach historical case studies. The fact that the JTF is itself an ad hoc organization, tailored to meet individual mission needs, makes this analysis even clearer for him.²⁸

The first problem which Major Metz discusses is that of the relationship between command authority and unity of effort in HAOs. He bluntly states that "command" of NGOs will never transpire and that an appropriate goal for the military commander is to "build communications links that foster unity of effort between the JTF and the relief agencies."²⁹ He also is highly cogniscent of time as a factor in HAOs, both because of political considerations and because of the intrinsic

nature of the relief mission itself (people will continue to die while time passes).

Major Metz explores identified problem areas between the military and NGOs in depth, analyzing three major areas of recurring disconnection. They are neutrality and impartiality, organization and professionalism, and coordination. He finds fault on both sides, but predominately in the NGO camp. He feels that the international relief community is attempting to redress some of these faults through training, self-examination, and more explicit codes of conduct.

His overall vision is that each player brings unique assets to the HAO "table." NGOs bring strong organizational commitment and unequaled regional situational awareness. The military brings security and an unmatched logistics and transportation capability. Proper command and organizational techniques can focus and promote the synergy rather than the dissonance between the military and NGOs.

Major Susan Sweatt, USMC, has authored a refreshingly candid and honest look at military interaction with NGOs in Somalia under the auspices of the Joint Military Operations Department of the Naval War College.³⁰ In "The Challenges of Civil-Military Relations on Operations at the Trailing Edge of War" Major Sweatt maintains that joint interagency training, prior planning between military and civilian agencies, the inclusion of the OFDA in operational-level military HAO planning, and a robust CMOC structure are necessary if HAOs are to be successful in the future.³¹

The value of this work, however, lies beyond these rather pro forma conclusions. Major Sweatt presents some of the most candid,

unfiltered examples of genuine disconnection between the military and NGOs of any work available. She clearly describes how differences in conceptual end states negatively affected NGO and military relations. Remarkably, she bluntly states that the unity of effort which was eventually achieved between the military and NGOs in Somalia resulted from personalities rather than organizational systems.³²

The final work in this area is perhaps the most exhaustive. Jonathan Dworkan of the Center for Naval Analysis was tasked to explore the specific dynamics of military relations with NGOs in Somalia for their lessons learned program.³³ His detailed work "Military Relations with Humanitarian Relief Organizations: Observations from Restore Hope" begins by laying out a situational outline of both military and relief agency operations in Somalia, describes in detail the organizational methods used by the military to facilitate ongoing interaction, and closely examines many of the most contentious issues which arose between the military and NGOs.

Dworkan's conclusions are specific and highly detailed. He believes that the CMOC is the organizational key to better interaction. However, he would elevate the CMOC even farther in the military hierarchy by placing it directly under the JTF commander as a stand-alone staff section, rather than subordinating it to Civil Affairs, the G-3, or the G-5. He also believes that the CMOC should be physically located in the JTF Headquarters, because he contends that the more day-by-day familiarity military planners have with NGO representatives the better the cooperation will be.³⁴

He further argues that previous experience in HAOs should be at least a partial criteria for selection as a CMOC staff member and that specialized training might have to be made available in the military system for such roles. Finally, he maintains that the command climate set by the HAO military commander needs to support CMOC military personnel who fairly and aggressively represent the perspectives of NGOs to the wider JTF staff, rather than accusing them of being "co-opted."³⁵

Dworken, while arguing for organizational changes, does not denigrate the need for changes in organizational culture and attitude as well. He states that the command has a responsibility to promote the image that NGOs are allies and friends. He advocates issuing booklets on NGOs and instructions on how to interact with them properly, somewhat along the line of current handbooks issued on threats in any given operation.³⁶

His conclusion is that the military and NGOs have different organizational cultures. The key to resolving differences is overcoming the differences in those cultures. He also thinks that there will always be differences of opinion between the military and NGOs. In that light he defines the true goal in this arena as making certain that only real differences become problems, not misunderstandings due to differing organizational methodologies, stereotypes, or biases.³⁷ The focus of his paper, by his own admission, is on the military and its need for change. He does not address the changes (if any) which NGOs might have to make to accommodate themselves to HAOs involving military forces.

The Center for Naval Analysis sponsored another report on Somalia, which was wider in scope: "Operation Restore Hope: Summary

Report" by David Zvijac and Katherine McGrady.³⁸ The importance of this work lies in the clarity of its analysis of how confusion and disagreement within the military about how to interpret its mission statement led to serious problems with NGOs. These authors' willingness to define operational success based on a specific criteria of meeting the needs of NGOs rather than on the conduct of traditional military-type operations also makes this work significant.³⁹

Numerous works are presently in circulation describing the work of specialized military functions in recent HAOs. Some of these are germane because they uncover additional aspects of NGO and military interaction. From the legal perspective Colonel F. M. Lorenz's "Law and Anarchy in Somalia" is quite revealing.⁴⁰ A lawyer for the United States Marine Corps, Colonel Lorenz's discussion explains clearly the legal basis for the apparently contradictory use of deadly force in "humanitarian" operations. Dr. Truman Sharp, USN, explains how specific medical capabilities unique to the military can genuinely complement and extend the abilities of NGOs.⁴¹ From the religious support perspective, U.S. Army Chaplain (Colonel) Gary Councell's "Chaplain Roles in Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Operations" not only describes the work of chaplains in support of the military personnel employed in HAOs, but also notes the ease and immediate trust which often exists between chaplains and many NGO representatives.⁴²

Civilian sources have contributed to the understanding of this field as well. The Honorable Robert Oakley was President Bush's special envoy to Somalia. Writing in the Autumn 1993 issue of Joint Forces Quarterly, he acknowledges friction between the military and NGOs, but

minimizes it and celebrates its resolution.⁴³ Mr. Oakley, interestingly enough, follows Major Sweatt in emphasizing the primacy of personalities as the key to resolution of these problems, even though he describes the formal organizational structures.⁴⁴

References to NGOs, by various names, are scattered throughout doctrinal publications. Two of these documents, however, are central to understanding the military's current doctrinal perspective on NGOs. These are Joint Publication FM 100-23-2, Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations (Final Draft, March 1994),⁴⁵ and Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations (First Draft, 31 January 1995).⁴⁶

FM 100-23-2 is the military's capstone document in regards to doctrine guiding relationships with nonmilitary agencies. It is quite wide in scope, dealing with coordination from the strategic to the tactical level. The concept of strategic and operational level coordination with NGOs is a decided doctrinal innovation. Prior to this publication such coordination was totally ad hoc, if in fact it happened at all.

This manual defines the response to HA situations as containing three elements: a triad consisting of political, military, and humanitarian organizations. Each of these elements must be balanced within an operation to insure the success of large-scale HAOs. A problem at the strategic level is that the strategic goals of all of the organizations involved may not be completely compatible with military objectives.⁴⁷ At the strategic level the military element is the Department of Defense and the NGO element is represented by OFDA and

USAID. Various U.N. activities are also defined as strategic elements, as is the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

At the operational level the Unified Commander-in-Chief (CINC) is defined as the military element in the response triad, responsible for developing military responses to HA situations.⁴⁸ USAID/OFDA, however, also has the statutory authority to organize and coordinate the total U.S. Government's foreign disaster relief response. Both elements have the option to create or activate specific suborganizations to handle this responsibility. A CINC may use a Humanitarian Action Coordination Center (HACC). OFDA normally employs a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART). These organizations interact closely with one another and NGOs may interact with either or both of them.

At the tactical level (usually within a joint task force [JTF] or combined joint task force [CJTF]) the functional organizations are closely tailored to meet the specific needs of any given HA situation. The military element uses a CMOC to maximize interaction with NGOs. This FM describes the CMOC in great detail, even down to the level of desk layout diagrams.

The explicit, stated mission of the CMOC is to respond to validated logistical and security support requirements of NGOs.⁴⁹ The underlying concept is one of giving NGOs a single focal point within the military structure with which to interact.

The CMOC usually consists of eight to twelve persons, operates twenty-four hours a day, and has four sections (in addition to the director and deputy): Operations, Civil Affairs, Support, and Liaison. The latter is staffed by representatives from key activities (such as

ports or airfields) and other military organizations (such as coalition forces). This FM characterizes the CMOC as an integral element of the JTF or CJTF but does not specify its relationship to the other staff elements.⁵⁰

FM 100-23-2 is heavily oriented towards formal organizational structures and gives only slight emphasis to other aspects of interagency coordination and cooperation. It does, however, mention problems which some NGOs have with the concept of working with the military. It states that relationships with nonmilitary agencies should be based on appreciation of their missions and notes that their regional involvement in HA situations is quite often long term.

At the operational level this FM recommends the use of a civilian agency, OFDA, to resolve NGO and military coordination problems.⁵¹

The first draft of Joint Publication 3-08 (Joint Pub 3-08) takes a much broader approach than does FM 100-23-2. InterAction Member Profiles 1993 is one of the source documents.⁵² A paper, authored by the World Conference on Religion and Peace, discussing complex humanitarian emergencies is also included as an additional source of information.⁵³

What Joint Pub 3-08 attempts to do is develop systematic guidelines for interagency coordination. NGOs are seen as an essential part of the interagency environment. A step-by-step methodology for building interagency consensus is prescribed.⁵⁴ It is:

(a) Define the problem in clear and unambiguous terms agreed to by all parties.

(b) Define the objective of the operation.

- (c) Establish a common frame of reference.
- (d) Develop courses of action/options.
- (e) Capitalize on experience.
- (f) Establish responsibility.
- (g) Direct all means towards a common purpose.

This joint publication also breaks entirely new doctrinal ground by introducing a new type of command relationship in addition to the traditional ones of "supported" and "Supporting." The new term is "associate"---used to describe the relationship between armed forces and NGOs which do not operate within either the military or governmental hierarchy.⁵⁵

Literature from the NGOs themselves is, as mentioned in the first chapter, one of the key elements in this research. On the whole, however, NGOs do not publish formal writings or documents appropriate to inclusion in a formal literature review. There are, however, some exceptions to this general rule (in addition to the aforementioned InterAction Member Profiles 1993).

In order to examine the dynamics of cooperation between the military and NGOs, attention should be given to instances where NGOs have attempted to cooperate within their own organizational community. Working Together: NGO Cooperation in Seven African Countries, co-authored by Charles Duell and Laurel Dutcher, examines this specific issue.⁵⁶ Their historical case studies of NGO cooperation in eastern and south-central Africa examines several different models. They come to no overriding conclusions but do clearly illustrate how cooperation between even widely divergent NGOs is possible under certain circumstances.

The Meridian International Center, at the request of the U.S. Department of State, prepared a formal report on an interagency conference held in June 1994. "Conference Report: Improving Coordination of Humanitarian and Military Operations" was the result.⁵⁷ This report strongly emphasizes the differences between the organizational cultures of NGOs and the military, the need for continued interagency training, the need for all elements involved in HAOs to agree on a shared agenda, and intentional cooperation to avoid "mission creep."

Almost every NGO has some sort of values and mission statement, code of personal or operational conduct for employees, and in-house operational documents. One of the most comprehensive of these documents is the "CRS Guidelines on Humanitarian Assistance in Conflict Situations," produced by Catholic Relief Services.⁵⁸

This document is an invaluable "type" document. It greatly aids the understanding of the philosophies which bring NGOs into relief situations. The CRS guidelines, for example, start with a value-based declaration. "The fundamental motivating force in all activities of the CRS is the Gospel of Jesus Christ as it pertains to the alleviation of human suffering."⁵⁹ The document then describes conditions and principles which guide CRS in the selection and conduct of relief missions, operational considerations used to design responses to humanitarian needs, and detailed personnel considerations for field workers (including an absolute prohibition against bearing firearms).⁶⁰ Other NGO documents cover similar ground, although not always as comprehensively or concisely.

Several of the preceding works have mentioned "organizational culture" as a source of conflict between the military and NGOs in MOOTW environments. Professor Edgar H. Schein of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Sloan School of Management has authored an extremely helpful book in this area, Organizational Culture and Leadership.⁶¹ In this book Dr. Schein defines organizational culture as "a pattern of shared basic assumptions which the group learned as it solved its problems considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members."⁶²

He then goes on to describe three levels of organizational culture.⁶³ The first is the artifacts. These are the visible organizational structures and processes. They also may include other types of visible symbols (such as unit patches, although Professor Schein does not use military examples). A point which he makes is that often these artifacts are difficult or impossible to understand or decipher unless one knows something about the other two levels of the organization's culture.

The next level of organizational culture are the espoused values. These are the values shared by the group as a whole about how and why things work (and what will make them work correctly). These values are often expressed in formal documents, manuals, or (in the case of the military) doctrinal literature. They may be specific principles or unvarnished value-based statements, such as "people come first." However, they are explicitly known within the organization itself. Understanding these values, furthermore, can make understanding of organizational cultural artifacts easier.

The third level of organizational culture in Dr. Schein's methodology is that of basic underlying assumption. These are "unconscious, taken-for-granted beliefs, perceptions, thoughts, and feelings--the ultimate source of values and actions."⁶⁴ They are not usually written down, but permeate actual conceptual models an organization uses to approach any and every problem. Rarely are they even articulated, much less questioned. It is fair to say that often they are woven in to the very warp and woof of what an organization is all about. Understanding these basic underlying assumptions will make understanding the organization as a whole much easier than if one only examines the other levels.

This review of the current literature in the field of military and NGO interaction clearly shows that the current interest in this field is linked in a large part to recent experience in MOOTWs, particularly in Somalia. It also shows that there have been problems, acknowledged by all parties, in the working relationship between NGOs and military forces on the ground. There is not a full consensus concerning the roots of these problems. The military has developed doctrinal guidelines to direct military commanders and planners towards actions which will ensure better cooperation with NGOs in future operations. NGOs are also examining their own roles and responses to situations involving cooperation with military forces in situations involving responses to humanitarian emergencies.

Endnotes

¹Kevin M. Cahill, A Framework for Survival: Health, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Assistance in Conflicts and Disasters (New York: Basic Books and the Council on Foreign Relations, 1993).

²Graham Hancock, Lords of Poverty: The Power, Prestige, and Corruption of the International Aid Business (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1989).

³Jonathan Benthall, Disasters, Relief, and the Media (London: I.B. Tauris & Co., Ltd., 1993).

⁴Joseph Stremmlau, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War (New York: Basic Books, 1979).

⁵Joseph E. Thompson, American Policy and African Famine: The Nigeria-Biafra Civil War, 1966-1970 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990).

⁶John De St. Jorre, The Nigerian Civil War (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1972).

⁷David Stoll, Is Latin America Turning Protestant? (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1990).

⁸Terry Waite, Taken on Trust (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & Company, 1993).

⁹Henk Vos and James H. Bilbray, "Peacekeeping and the New International Environment," The Officer, June 1995, 41-46.

¹⁰Andrew S. Natsios, "Food Through Force: Humanitarian Intervention and U.S. Policy" The Washington Quarterly 17,1 (Winter 1994): 129-144.

¹¹Ernest L. Sutton, The New Role of Humanitarian Assistance in National Military Strategy and How to Make It Better (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1992).

¹²Ibid., 23-25.

¹³William J. Marshall III, By Separate Action: Humanitarian Assistance (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1993).

¹⁴Ibid., Chapter III.

¹⁵Ibid., 12-13.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Balbeer K. Sihra, "Relief Agencies and the U.S. Military: Partners in Humanitarian Operations," Marine Corps Gazette, March 1994, 44.

¹⁶Carol D. Clair, Humanitarian Assistance and the Elements of Operational Design (monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, USACGSC, 1993).

¹⁹Ibid., 36-58.

²⁰Ibid., 35.

²¹Roger C. Easton, Jr., "Somalia: Key Operational Considerations and Implications in an Era of Peace-Enforcement and Forced Humanitarian Assistance Ventures" (monograph, Naval War College, 1993).

²²Ibid., 4.

²³Thomas G. Pope, "Beans, Bullets, and Band-Aids: Attaining Unity of Effort in Humanitarian Intervention Operations" (monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, USACGSC, 1994).

²⁴Ibid., 8.

²⁵Ibid., 39.

²⁶John M. Metz, "Humanitarian Assistance Operations: A Command and Control Dilemma" (MMAS thesis, USACGSC, 1995).

²⁷Ibid., iii.

²⁸Ibid., 10.

²⁹Ibid., 32.

³⁰Susan G. Sweatt, "The Challenges of Civil-Military Relations at the Trailing Edge of War" (monograph, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 1995).

³¹Ibid., 15-18

³²Ibid., 8

³³Jonathan T. Dworken, "Military Relations with Humanitarian Relief Organizations: Observations from Restore Hope: (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, 1993).

³⁴Ibid., 42.

³⁵Ibid., 43-44.

³⁶Ibid., 44-45.

³⁷Ibid., 50.

³⁸David J. Zvijac and Katherine A.W. McGrady, "Operation Restore Hope: Summary Report" (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, 1994)

³⁹Ibid., 19.

⁴⁰F. M. Lorenz, "Law and Anarchy in Somalia," Parameters, Winter 1993-94, 27-41.

⁴¹Truman W. Sharp, Ray Yip, and John D. Malone, U.S. Military Forces and Emergency International Humanitarian Assistance (Bethesda, MD: Naval Medical Research and Development Command, 1994).

⁴²Gary R. Councell, "Chaplain Roles in Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Operations" (monograph, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1994), 46.

⁴³Robert B. Oakley, "An Envoy's Perspective," Joint Forces Quarterly 2 (Autumn 1993): 44-63.

⁴⁴Ibid., 48.

⁴⁵Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations (First Draft) (Washington, D.C.: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995).

⁴⁶U.S. Army Field Manual 100-23-2, Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations (Final Draft) (Fort Monroe, VA: Air, Land Sea Applications Center, 1994).

⁴⁷Ibid., 2-7, 2-8.

⁴⁸Ibid., 3-3.

⁴⁹Ibid., 4-27.

⁵⁰Ibid., 4-24.

⁵¹Ibid., 3-8.

⁵²See complete reference in the bibliography. This book details organizational aspects of many major NGOs and as been an invaluable source of background information for this author.

⁵³Joint Publication 3-08, xi.

⁵⁴Ibid., I-11 to I-16.

⁵⁵Ibid., II-41.

⁵⁶Charles B. Duell and Laurel A. Dutcher, Working Together: NGO Cooperation in Seven African Countries (New York: American Council for Voluntary International Action, 1987).

⁵⁷U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Conference Report: Improving Coordination of Humanitarian and Military Operations (Washington, DC: Meridian International Center, 1994).

⁵⁸Catholic Relief Services, CRS Guidelines on Humanitarian Assistance in Conflict Situations (Harpers Ferry, VA, 1991, revised 1992).

⁵⁹Ibid., 1.

⁶⁰Ibid., 11.

⁶¹Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 2d ed. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1992).

⁶²Ibid., 12.

⁶³Ibid., 16-27.

⁶⁴Ibid., Diagram, 17.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The goal of this study, as was previously stated, is to contribute to the military's ability to help the helpless. This goal is not questioned by anyone. The effectiveness of the military's efforts to do so in conjunction with NGOs is what this research is investigating.

The methodology for this study involves integrated, multi-disciplinary analysis and synthesis. Historical background and perspective as well as analysis of a specific case study is necessary in order to understand both the overall nature of the problems and the context of after-action reviews (AARs) or similar civilian documents.

Content analysis is the key to understanding the military's doctrinal writings, the values and missions statements of NGOs, and the contributions of professional journals in this field. Particular care is needed in deciphering the varying systems of in-house jargon and the cultural and organizational code words used in these writings.

Synthesis is the methodological tool used to obtain maximum benefit from the morass of written literature which exists within or on the periphery of this area. The extensive literature review showed that many authors address this subject matter. Some approach these issues from complimentary perspectives, other from competing ones. Some sort

of synthesis is essential to bring any sort of rational order from the literature.

This methodology is basically deductive in nature. After the background is laid out then a series of observations deriving from an organizational analysis of both the military and NGOs, as well as from a case study, will be made. From these observations, conclusions will be drawn and recommendations made.

The format of this paper is derived from this deductive methodology. Chapter 1 introduces the topic, describes its general background and importance today, and establishes the primary and subordinate research questions.

Chapter 2 is an extensive literature review. It introduces the both the background material and the most current literature, outlines recent doctrinal publications, and illustrates varying analytical perspectives in this area.

This chapter is intentionally lengthy. A thorough background in the recent events and varying perspectives on NGO and military interaction is absolutely necessary to following the analysis in this remainder of this study. The author's choice was whether to introduce this background material piecemeal throughout the analytical chapters, or initially in a comprehensive block. The first technique has the advantage of connecting the material directly to the issue at hand, but often breaks the flow of the argument and analysis. The second technique maintains the flow of the argument and minimizes repetition caused by single background sources relating to multiple argument lines, but results in the need to absorb a large amount of background material

at one time. The suitability of either approach can be equally argued. This author has chosen the latter approach, placing the majority of the background materials up front in the literature review.

The research methodology is explained in the present chapter. Chapter 4 then moves on to an exploration of organizational structures and other characteristics of the military and NGOs. It will define, compare, and contrast the values on which the military and NGOs are based. It will explore the organizational cultures of both the military, making extensive use of the three tier model of organizational culture developed by Professor Edgar Schein.

The thrust of chapter 4 is not historical or case study based. Historical examples, however, will be used to illustrate organizational values in action, particularly when such illustrations will lead to a better understanding of operational implications.

Chapter 5 is based on a case study of OPERATION RESTORE HOPE in Somalia. The focus of this case study will not be on the overall military operation, although that will be briefly reviewed in order to establish a clear context. The focus will be, rather, on the characteristics of the interaction between the military and NGOs in that operation.

Chapter 6 will present the conclusions of this research and provide recommendations for change. It will also provide recommended directions for future research and study.

The primary weakness in this methodology is that the validity of the findings depends solely upon the thoroughness of the research and the accuracy of the analysis.¹ Research into organizational structures

and underlying value systems, focusing on conflicts which often manifest themselves only in operational settings, is not conducive to quantitative verification. The accuracy, therefore, of this study ultimately rests upon the analytical ability of the author.

This weakness is mitigated by the extensive materials available for study in this area. The close documentation and extensive use of endnotes throughout this study is a reflection of more than the author's ethical concerns about giving credit where credit is due. The only real hedge against total subjectivity in nonquantitative analysis is the ruthless cross-checking of each premise against other voices in the field. Multitudinous endnotes are the price this author has chosen to pay for the sake of insuring academic accuracy.

Endnote

¹The author is indebted to a previous MMAS thesis for language used to describe the inherent weakness in analytical methodology. The topic addressed by Major Michael E. Donovan, USA, in his 1994 MMAS thesis, "Non-Strategic Nuclear Targeting in a Non-Nuclear Army," is about as distant from this author's topic as possible. However, his discussion on pages 18-19 concerning his research limitations parallels this author's concerns exactly and I have freely drawn upon his concepts and language.

CHAPTER 4

THE MILITARY AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS:

ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

Studies of the organizational characteristics of the U.S. military have been carried out by a variety of authors for an even wider variety of reasons. These reasons range from the purely practical one of increasing organizational efficiency to more esoteric ones involving the sociological ramifications of a "closed" organizational system or the effects of these systems on society as a whole.

There appear to exist no formal, focused studies of the organizational characteristics of NGOs. Studies have been done, however, which focus on many aspects of volunteer organizations and those individuals who volunteer for primarily altruistic reasons to join such organizations. NGOs are not purely volunteer organizations. Some of the characteristics of these organizations, however, and of their employees, may hold true for NGOs as well, particularly considering the altruistically based missions and functions statements of those NGOs.

Some of the difficulty which writers in this field have experienced is being able to set the military and NGOs into any sort of common context or frame of reference for examination. Professor Edgar Schein's study on organizational culture, discussed in the second chapter, describes a three-level model of organizational culture which can be applied to any organization. Examining both the military and

NGOs using this model sheds light on both the differences and similarities between them.

The Military

This section will examine selected characteristics of the U.S. Army. The assumption is made here that while organizational characteristics of the U.S. Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps may differ in some aspects from that of the U.S. Army, that their overall characteristics as military organizations of the United States will be the same; or--in other words--the similarities between the Armed Services will far outweigh any dissimilarities in the context of contrasting them to nonmilitary organizations.

The first point to be made is that the U.S. Army considers itself to be a *values based institution*. It is composed of individuals who participate in a traditional, values-centered profession, the profession of arms. "The men and women serving in America's Army are members of an old and noble profession, rich in heritage and steeped in tradition."¹

In addition to the overall values of the profession of arms (values which are often difficult to pin down specifically), the U.S. Army has a defined set of values. These are currently termed "The Army Ethos," and are viewed as the basis for successful mission performance. This ethos is encapsulated in one word, "duty." Duty, defined as "behavior required by moral obligation, demanded by custom, or enjoined by feelings of rightness," contains two subordinate concepts: integrity and selfless service.

Integrity is defined as "the uncompromising adherence to a code of moral values, utter sincerity, and the avoidance of deception or expediency of any kind. Importantly, its justification includes explicit reference to a fundamental purpose for any military's existence. Integrity "provides the basis for the trust and confidence that must exist among those whose profession entails the measured application of violence and death."²

Selfless service demands a "willingness to sacrifice one's self" and is "inherent in military service." It seen as dependent on individual choice. "All who serve the Nation must resist the temptation to place self-interest above the common good."³

The U.S. Army is extremely serious about the fundamental nature and criticality of this ethos. FM 100-1 goes on to state:

Since the Army ethos is the informal bond of trust between the Nation and the Army, professional soldiers are enjoined to embrace and live it. The ethos applies in peace and war, to Active and Reserve forces, and to Department of the Army civilians. The Army ethos inspires the sense of purpose necessary to sustain soldiers in the brutal realities of combat and to tolerate the ambiguities of military operations where war has not been declared. To violate the Army ethos or tolerate its violation dishonors the profession and may compromise the Nation's security.⁴

The Army goes on to define five "core qualities" as individual attributes of the professional soldier or officer. These core qualities are perceived as the essential undergirding to the Army ethos. The five core qualities are commitment, competence, candor, compassion, and courage. These qualities are defined and expanded in Army literature by specific explanations, examples, and illustrations.

Linked to these values is the concept of a personal oath, the Oath of Enlistment (for noncommissioned officers and other ranks) or the

Oath of Commission (for warrant and commissioned officers). The importance of this oath, for the American soldier, is deeper than the purely legal commitment which taking it compels. It is genuinely seen as an oath of personal honor, to be cherished and upheld at all times and at all costs. Although the conversation is fictional, author Michael Shaara's account of a conversation between Generals Lee and Longstreet, Confederate States of America, just prior to the battle of Gettysburg accurately depicts the importance of this oath to the career American soldier.

"It troubles me sometimes," Longstreet said. His mind rang a warning, but he went on grimly, as you ride over rocks. "They're never quite the enemy, those boys in blue."

"I know," Lee said.

"I used to command those boys," Longstreet said. "Difficult thing to fight men you used to command."

Lee said nothing.

"Swore an oath too," Longstreet said. He shook his head violently. Strange thought to have, at the moment. "I must say, there are times when I'm troubled. But couldn't fight against home. Not against your own family. And yet...we broke the vow."

Lee said, "Let's not think on that today."

"Yes," Longstreet said. There was a moment of dusty silence. He grumbled to himself: why did you start that? Why talk about that now? Damn fool.

Then Lee said, "There was a higher duty to Virginia. That was the first duty. There was never any doubt about that."

"Guess not," Longstreet said. But we broke the vow.⁵

This personal oath, which defines so much of military conduct and which every soldier of any rank is expected to honor with his or her life if necessary, has two direct implications for the Army as an organization.

The first is that the purpose for which the Army exists, to fight and win the Nation's wars, is also a purpose to which members of the Army commit themselves as individuals by personal oath. "I . . . do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the

United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic." The significance of the oath, to a great extent, internalizes the Army organizational purpose in its individual members.

The second effect is that members of the Army will generally act in accordance with and in obedience to the orders of their superiors. For enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers this is an explicit part of their Oath of Enlistment. For commissioned personnel it is implied in the phrase, "I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office upon which I am about to enter."⁶

It can be seen that the Army is an entity whose organizational purpose is shared by the members of the organization and which instills conformity to the direction of one's superiors as a fundamental organizational value. The Army, furthermore is an organization which accepts violence as a given factor in its operating environment. In fact the Army employs (or potentially employs) violence as an integral part of its basic mission of defending the Nation.

The Army also has a legal, statutory foundation for both its existence and its actions. "The legal basis for a military establishment is clearly set forth in the Constitution."⁷ The Constitution provides for the president to act as the commander in chief of U.S. military forces and charges Congress with the responsibility of raising and supporting armies and declaring war.

Ongoing developments in law and custom have led to the military apparatus that exists in the United States today. The specifics of this structure are important to this study in three respects. The first is that the legal authority for the military rests in the United States

Code (Titles 10 and 32). The second is that there is legal authority for directive and disciplinary actions within the military, particularized in The Uniform Code of Military Justice. Finally the Goldwater-Nichols Act has clarified the workings of the chain of command, establishing extremely clear lines reaching from the president (or, more properly speaking, the national command authority) all the way down to the individual soldier, sailor, airman, or Marine--or their officers--anywhere in the world.

A direct effect of these three factors is that the military personnel involved in a MOOTW clearly understand that their role is to serve the ends of the United States by performing a mission under directive authority. This is not to imply that personal or organizational initiative would be discouraged in a MOOTW situation. Initiative is considered to be a positive attribute in military circles. It does mean, however, that the activities, commitments, and endeavors which the military undertakes on the ground in a MOOTW will be done in conformity to the overall standards of the national objectives of the United States and in accordance with the directives or intents of the military superiors involved.

This brief rundown depicts aspects of the formal military organization; an organization based in written declarations of transcendent organizational values and binding oaths by the individuals who serve, a consciousness of being established by and wielding legal authority, and a formal commitment to the principals of obedience to command; all directed towards service to the Nation. What are the

results if Edgar Schein's three levels of organizational culture are applied to this formal, official military system?⁸

In the U.S. military the artifacts (the visible organizational structure) and the espoused values often coincide. The importance of command, for example, is an espoused value, as the aforementioned oath of enlistment and numerous formal policies, doctrinal statements, and legal regulations exemplify. The significance and importance of command, however, are also integral to the Army's visible structure. Simple things such as the green tabs which commanders alone may wear on their epaulets, or the fact that a certain standard radio call-number (usually the number "six") is customarily reserved for commanders alone, are simple examples. So are more complex practices, such as the place and authority (moral and legal) of the commander in the organizational structure or the formal and informal roles of the commander (and, at times, the commander's spouse) in the military social structure.

In the U.S. military there is very little difference between these two levels of organizational culture as delineated by Schein. The artifacts (the visible organizational structures, processes, symbols, and physical environment) are clearly linked in almost all cases to the espoused values (the strategies, goals, and philosophies of the organization).

The role and customs of command clearly demonstrate this linkage. So does the practice of taking oaths in a formal ceremony (the oath is the artifact, integrity and service are espoused values which the oaths support). Awarding a soldier a medal for excellent marksmanship is another example. The medal itself is the artifact;

competence, in this case with a personal weapon, is the espoused value. All of the other skill awards which either adorn uniforms or are noted in personnel files and therefore affect promotion, retention, or duty assignment are further examples of the same linkage.

Questions are often raised on a case-by-case basis about the effectiveness or appropriateness of these linkages. At times, for instance, certain command privileges have been seen as abusive or inappropriate. The popular media, for instance, recently criticized a senior commander who purportedly had others stand in a latrine line on his behalf so he would not have to waste time doing so. Or, as another example, writers from both within and without the military contend that the present award system is too generous, out of balance, and thereby is losing its meaning as an effective organizational artifact.

These and other criticisms may be valid. However, they do not change the main point here--that these first two levels of organizational culture are closely linked in the military. The criticisms are merely commentary on efficiency of the linkage.

What, then, of the third level in Schein's methodology, the basic underlying assumptions? Are the military's perceptions, thoughts, feelings, and unconscious, taken-for-granted beliefs congruent with the other two levels of organizational culture?

Formal sociological or behavioral studies do not normally address this question precisely because these beliefs are taken for granted--even by sociologists themselves--and could be said to constitute by definition the very warp and woof of what a military

organization is all about. A list of these beliefs, however, clearly includes:

- a. The national interest is worthy of support.
- b. Somebody has to be in charge.
- c. Discipline and order are good things.
- d. Carrying out a mission is more than a job, it is a duty.

This list is by no means exhaustive, but neither is it miscellaneous. It is, rather, a set of assumptions which, arguably, are shared by professionals at all levels of the U.S. military establishment. And, of equal importance, these perceptions and attitudes about the nature of the military are shared (in varying degrees) by those outside of the military itself.

They hold that these beliefs have on military professionals is unquestionable. When has a military leader or planner argued that the national interest is unimportant? There are debates about whether a certain situation actually is a threat to the national interest, or about the degree of the threat, or even (after Vietnam, anyway) about the appropriateness of the military instrument as the response in a given situation. But no member of the military argues that the national interest is of anything but primary importance.

The perspective of the military about command ("Someone has to be in charge.") is almost a cliché. "Who's in charge here?" is the first question barked out by a military officer or NCO whenever something seems amiss. As this author researched this thesis the military professionals with whom he dealt repeatedly echoed the theme that the major problem with NGOs is either that "no one is in charge of

them" and that any problems could be cured simply by "someone getting a handle on those folks."

That "knee-jerk" response and the cliché above are not merely apocryphal. They reflect an unspoken--and unquestioned--assumption by the military as an organizational entity: that in any situation someone has to be clearly in charge.

Discipline and the military are so closely linked in common thought that the phrase "military discipline" is often used as a clear illustration of a redundant term. There are, however, individuals, organizations, and social movements which differ in their views on the value of discipline, seeing it as an infringement of personal liberty, a hindrance to free thought and creativity, and an impediment to genuine initiative.

The point here is that for most military professionals discipline and order are almost invariably seen as "good" things. This far transcends discipline in combat settings. One has only to drive onto a military base and look at the housing areas, or deal with military offices (such as those on the "community" side of a military installation) which have nothing to do with combat to realize that discipline and order permeate the organization as a whole.

The importance of getting the job done, the concept that mission accomplishment has an importance which is greater than simply getting a task completed, is the final--but perhaps the most important--basic underlying assumption of the military. It is not as clearly defined and is a bit more difficult to illustrate than the previous three basic underlying assumptions. However, it is a reality nonetheless, a reality

which directly affects the military professional's view of things which are perceived to block or hinder mission accomplishment.

Schein would argue that if these four unstated basic assumptions are valid then they should inform the observer about the understanding and meaning of elements of the other levels, particularly the potentially confusing or unintelligible meaning of cultural artifacts. "Once one understands [the basic underlying assumptions] one can easily understand the other more surface levels."⁹

An example of this would be the artifact of uniform haircut and grooming standards for garrison soldiers in peacetime. There is no objective, physical reason for these standards (that is to say a demonstrable case cannot be made that the length of a soldier's hair affects his or her ability to perform any given task or set of tasks). They are, therefore, often confusing to outsiders. Why, they wonder, would the military would spend time, money, and energy on such peripheral or irrelevant issues?

This artifact is totally intelligible, however, if the basic underlying assumption that discipline and order are a good thing is considered. Uniformity is usually viewed as a direct corollary to order. Similarity in appearance decreases the occurrence of one factor (differing styles of fashion) which at times may lead to tension between individuals and groups within an organization. (The same argument is currently being made for adopting uniforms in public schools to decrease tension between ethnic groups, gangs, and economic classes.) If order and discipline are good things *in and of themselves* then uniform

haircuts, as a physical manifestations of organizational order and unity, make perfect sense.

Similar analysis can be done in terms of commitment to the national interest. That assumption makes artifacts such as the elaborate ceremonies, customs, and courtesies surrounding the American flag make sense. Otherwise what is the objective reason for stopping even the motor traffic on a military post while music is played and the flag lowered? This basic underlying assumption also explains the importance of such artifacts as a Presidential Unit Citation and other visible demonstrations of national support as well as the espoused values of responsiveness to civilian control of the military (exemplified even by the term commonly used in the military to describe the president or his civilian successor, the national command authority).

Artifacts relating to command have already been discussed. Again, those artifacts are much more easily understood when seen in the context of the basic underlying assumption concerning the importance of having someone in charge. If military customs and physical symbols which overtly magnify the importance of command are seen as supporting this most basic underlying assumption they make sense. Otherwise the symbolism of green tabs, standing when the commander enters a room, saluting when that commander concludes a meeting, remembering specific radio call-numbers--all of which are understandable as outworkings of a basic underlying assumption--become simply a confusing, senseless list of "do's and don'ts."

Nongovernmental Organizations

When analyzing the organizational structures and cultures of NGOs the first point which must be taken into account is that there is no monolithic, unified NGO structure akin to that of the U.S. military. NGOs are independent of each other (this fact plays a major role in operational command and control issues). They do not necessarily share all of the following organizational characteristics. However, given this constraint, it remains possible to examine some characteristics which pertain to the preponderance of NGOs, if not to each and every one.¹⁰

The second point which must be addressed up front is that NGOs, unlike the military, are not statutory in nature. They are not instruments of sovereign states (hence the name nongovernmental organization), nor do they have legal authority within their organizations parallel to that of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. This means (among other things) that they have no power to tax or raise revenue except from grants, donations, and investment of funds previously accrued from such sources.

NGOs, like the military, are *value-based institutions*. Many NGOs, such as Catholic Relief Services, the United Methodist Committee on Relief, or the Adventist Development and Relief Agency International, have their roots in specific religious communities. Those NGOs tend to reflect, on a formal level, the espoused values of those religious communities or denominations.

The mission statement of Catholic Relief Services (CRS), for example, states that, "The fundamental motivating force in all

activities of CRS is the gospel of Jesus Christ as it pertains to the alleviation of human suffering..."¹¹ For CRS there are five principles which follow from this basic commitment. Their "principles of response," as they term them are: (a) Principle of the Common Good, (b) Principle of Human Dignity, (c) Principle of Impartiality, (d) Principle of Non-Partisanship, and (e) Principle of (Organizational) Independence.¹²

Parent religious bodies often keep a very tight rein on the NGOs which they sponsor. Formulation and approval of the values and missions statement of the United Methodist Committee on Relief, for example, does not even rest with the NGO itself, but is done by the (particular) Church and can be found in the Book of Discipline which guides all United Methodist Church activities.¹³

Religiously oriented NGOs which operate from a support base that transcends a single denomination express their values in very similar ways to denominationally-based NGOs. World Vision, for example, promulgates a "Mission Statement" which affirms that:

World Vision is an international partnership of Christ whose mission is to follow our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ in working with the poor and oppressed to promote human transformation, seek justice, and bear witness to the good news of the Kingdom of God.¹⁴

World Vision "has identified certain values which lie at the centre of this understanding." These three core values are: (a) we are Christian, (b) we are committed to the poor, and (c) we value people.¹⁵

Nonreligious NGOs often express their values in action-oriented or ends-oriented mission statements. Save the Children, for example, an NGO which is active worldwide in children's and women's issues, simply

states that their mission is "the business of helping children and their families."¹⁶

They then go on to state the seven "core values and beliefs" by which their operations are guided. They are: (a) children and women first, (b) working together, (c) effective programs, (d) integration, (e) innovation, (f) respect, and (g) responsibility to supporters.¹⁷

These representative samples indicate that NGOs commonly start from an espoused value base of altruism (whether for explicitly religious reasons or otherwise) and then work to develop a contextual understanding of this espoused value in terms of their specific areas of focus or concern.

Once more turning to Schein's methodology, what are some of the artifacts of NGOs? Again, the diversity of these groups mitigates against comprehensive analysis, but some trends can be seen.

The first is that NGOs extensively utilize visible organizational symbols on their clothing and equipment. They are very concerned about demonstrating who they are and about "showing the flag" in their field operations. Their personnel will often wear clothing with the logo of the NGO prominently displayed. There are often very practical reasons for this, particularly in potentially hostile situations, reasons similar to why military personnel wear easily identifiable uniforms. There are, however, other reasons as well, based in organizational pride and culture.

The second trend is that NGOs are often concerned about reflecting outward, visible standards of their parent organizations. Employees of the United Methodist Committee on Relief, for example, are

prohibited from smoking or drinking. This is a historical standard of American Methodism and employees of the NGO are expected to adhere to those standards whether or not they personally believe in abstinence from those practices.

The third trend is that NGO field workers often (outwardly, at least) emphasize the cultural images of initiative, self-reliance, and independence from significant higher organizational control over their field operations. Although the existence of parent organizations is acknowledged and even celebrated (see the discussion of visible organizational symbols above) NGO culture magnifies the image of the worker on the ground who can "make it happen regardless of the bureaucracy."¹⁸

The final trend is the artifact of even-handedness or impartiality in the midst of conflict. NGOs pride themselves on personifying the standard of "malice towards none and charity towards all." Not only do workers at times express their independence from their parent organizations, but from control by authorities (governmental, factional, military) within their own operational area as well. The actions of the International Red Cross in northern Iraq were a clearly illustrated this. Their initial refusal to let U.S. military medical personnel even enter the camps they ran was explicitly based on this principle.

Are these "artifacts" congruent with the espoused values of these organizations? To a large extent it seems that they support those values, particularly if the long-term nature of NGO work is factored in to the analysis.

Evenhandedness, for example, could be seen as making little sense in and of itself. If one side in a conflict, or a neutral entity in an area of NGO operation, can provide security for relief efforts, or supplies and equipment needed to do good, how can it be refused? When viewed in light of the espoused value of impartiality, however, this artifact makes much more sense.

Insistence on promoting or maintaining individual group identification (and turf) can also seem quite arbitrary at times, particularly when it apparently works against efficiency and achievement of the overall goals in a disaster or relief situation. Many NGOs, however, have espoused mission statements which are based in highly particularized religious perspectives. In the context of such a mission statement it is amalgamation, rather than inefficiency, which presents the greatest threat to the goal of the NGO.

It is, by the way, important to note that this issue goes far beyond simple organizational survival. It is true that NGOs are very conscious of their donor-based finances and the need to publicize their work to insure that donors keep contributing. Their insistence on maintaining their own distinct identities exists for much more fundamental reasons. The refusal of the CRS to become involved in projects (even if fully funded by others) which are counter to their core religious values exemplifies this principle. From the NGO viewpoint values, as well as money, are at stake in these issues.

As was true with the military the artifacts and the espoused values of NGO organizational culture support each other. What about the other level, that of basic underlying assumptions?

NGOs as a whole operate with at least three basic underlying assumptions. These assumptions are: (a) that helping people is, in and of itself, a transcendent and valid goal, (b) that altruism is an effective motivational force for significant practical effort, and (c) that government(s) alone cannot meet the full range of human needs.

These three basic underlying assumptions bring clarity to the other levels of NGO organizational culture. Evenhandedness, or impartiality, for example, is often one of the most difficult artifacts for those outside of the NGOs to comprehend. How can an organization pledge itself to helping both sides, when one of them must be wrong? However, if helping people is in and of itself a good thing, then issues of which side is at fault or considerations of national interest become subordinate rather than definitive.

Likewise the insistence of NGOs on visible symbols and their espoused values of independence from interference with organizational values makes sense when viewed in light of the efficacy of altruism as a motivational force. Altruism must be both informed and focused to be effective. An NGO needs to maintain and to market its organizational identity and mission in order to practically tap into this motivational force to serve others.

This, by the way, also explains on a deeper level why many NGOs are so concerned with media coverage. Media coverage involves much more than simply getting the word out about the accomplishments of their particular group. The media is the means by which NGOs can touch the heartstrings of the man on the street and is the catalyst for setting in motion the altruistic response they believe all people are capable of.

The concept that government(s) alone cannot meet the whole range of human needs is as basic an assumption to NGOs as is the assumption of discipline to the military. It is the *raison de etre* for the existence of NGOs--to do those things which the government cannot or will not do.

If this basic underlying assumption is kept in mind then statements such as this, by World Vision, make a great deal of sense: "We regard all people as created and loved by God. We give priority to people before money, structure, systems, and other institutional machinery."¹⁹

The seemingly incomprehensible negativity of NGOs towards civilian and military government agencies can be more easily understood in light of this assumption. Military personnel often see NGO workers as merely hard-to-understand liberal do-gooders, who are difficult to control and have little or no respect for the realities of organizational discipline.²⁰ In actuality, however, the NGOs operate from a philosophical base which makes them feel as if they exist to fill the holes which the military, and other governmental organizations, simply ignore--even when they are appearing to help.

NGOs, unlike the military, live with some significant internal tensions between their levels of organizational culture. One of these tensions bears mentioning as this chapter concludes: the tension between their basic underlying assumption that helping people is a worthy goal in and of itself and their espoused values involving particular religious faiths or exclusive organizational values. The conflict, simply put, comes down to: What if helping people on the ground means surrendering or compromising these exclusive values?

This has recently come into focus for NGOs because of their experiences in Somalia (and, earlier, in Lebanon). Somalia was termed an extreme humanitarian emergency. One specific issue which NGOs had to face was whether to potentially compromise their standards of impartiality in order to secure armed personnel to provide security for relief supplies and personnel. (Their assumption was that there were no genuinely neutral armed personnel in Somalia.) Unarmed vehicles were not getting through. Not only was force necessary, but there was no working government to supply law enforcement personnel. NGOs had to struggle deeply with this issue and their answers were not uniform. The NGO community is attempting to formulate standards for future extreme humanitarian emergency situations.

In summary, NGOs, like the military, are value-based institutions. Unlike the military, they are not statutory in nature. Their organizational culture emphasizes the potential of the human community to help each other on a voluntary basis. They are often religiously based, but whether religious or nonreligious they all share the basic underlying assumption that altruism is a powerful motivating force. Finally, they believe that helping others is what life is all about, and attempt to do so in incredibly difficult circumstances.

One of these circumstances, Somalia, is what the case study in the next chapter will cover. In that unfortunate African nation NGOs and the military were to work together as never before. The introduction of these two organizational cultures into the same area of operations would have surprising results both for those they were trying to assist and for the organizations themselves.

Endnotes

¹U.S. Army Field Manual 100-1, The Army (Baltimore: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), i.

²Ibid., 7.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., 6.

⁵Michael Shaara, The Killer Angels (New York: Ballentine Books, 1974), 191.

⁶From the Oath of Office for commissioned officers, U.S. Army.

⁷FM 100-1, 13.

⁸For further discussion of Professor Schein's levels of organizational culture see pages 35-37 of this paper.

⁹Schein, 27.

¹⁰There are organizations such as InterAction which compile organizational information and group-by-group descriptions of many NGOs. Such data bases are becoming increasingly available through various sources (including InterAction itself) which maintain home pages on the internet.

¹¹Catholic Relief Services, CRS Guidelines on Humanitarian Assistance in Conflict Situations (Harpers Ferry, VA: Catholic Relief Services, 1992), 1.

¹²Ibid.

¹³The United Methodist Church, Book of Discipline (Nashville, Tennessee: Cokesbury, 1994).

¹⁴World Vision International, World Vision Mission Statement (Publication data not available, dated September 1989).

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Save the Children, "Fact Sheet: What We Believe," undated.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸I am indebted to numerous NGO workers I have known over the years for this insight, as well as to more recent acquaintances I worked with in support of U.S. relief efforts in Rwanda. They are left nameless intentionally as it is my understanding that command and control of NGO workers by their parent agencies remains (understandably) a contentious issue within the NGO community.

¹⁹World Vision Mission Statement, "Core Values" paragraph.

²⁰For further discussion of this perspective see Dworken,
37-38.

CHAPTER 5

NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION AND MILITARY INTERACTION IN SOMALIA

In January 1991 the government of Somalia, headed by President Siad Barre, was overthrown.¹ No single factional leader had enough military power to seize and maintain control over the entire country and no group of factions were able to form a lasting coalition to do so. By November 1991 the entire country had split into numerous territories controlled by warring factions. Most of these factions belonged to or were allied with different clans (extended families) rather than being motivated by any particular ideology or political agenda.

The ensuing chaos, accompanied by widespread violence, banditry, and general lack of security, created widespread starvation within a year. NGOs attempted to alleviate this starvation, but the overall lawlessness of the situation prevented (for the most part) intervention by these humanitarian agencies. The situation was particularly acute in the interior of the country. Neither limited and costly airlifts or cross-border convoys from Kenya were effective.

As the situation worsened the United Nations deployed a small military force to Somalia. This force, which was called UNOSOM (United National Operations in Somalia), had the mission of monitoring local cease fires so that relief supplies could be delivered. These efforts were not successful and UNOSOM's mission was not accomplished.

As the situation continued to deteriorate, NGOs operating in Somalia coordinated a world-wide publicity effort to focus the attention of the world on the crisis. This effort was highly successful. In July 1992 the U.N. authorized military airlift of relief supplies. The U.S. assisted in this effort by standing up a small JTF (JTF PROVIDE RELIEF), which established its headquarters in Mombassa, Kenya. Although they were able to airlift almost 5,000 tons of food per month their efforts were still inadequate.

The starvation in Somalia continued to worsen. The U.S., under tremendous pressure from the media, offered its good offices to the United Nations. The U.N. accepted this offer, and on 3 December 1992 the Security Council passed Resolution 793 authorizing direct military intervention in Somalia to be led by the armed forces of the United States.

In the security architecture of the United States, Somalia falls within the area of responsibility of the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM). At the direction of the President USCENTCOM established a Joint Task Force (JTF) (later to become a Combined Joint Task Force [CJTF]) to conduct operations in Somalia. This operation was designated OPERATION RESTORE HOPE. The Headquarters, First Marine Expeditionary Force (1 MEF) was selected as the CJTF headquarters and augmented with additional personnel to handle its expanded command and control (C2) responsibilities.

The overall objectives of OPERATION RESTORE HOPE, as articulated by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) were to: (a) secure

major airports, seaports, and food distribution points, (b) ensure the passage of relief supplies, and (c) assist the UN and NGOs.²

The 1 MEF, 10th Mountain Division (U.S. Army), and selected U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force assets were the primary forces assigned to the CJTF. Australia, Canada, Italy, Belgium, Morocco, India, France, and several other nations also provided ground and small naval components to the CJTF. These forces, however, were not directly commanded by the U.S. Control was exercised through UNITAF (United Task Force), as the expanded CJTF was eventually named. Ultimate command authority, however, rested in the national command channels of these various nations.

D-day for the CJTF was 9 December 1992. On that day elements of the 1 MEF landed in Somalia, taking the first step in what was conceived as a four phase operation. These projected phases were:

Phase I: USMC forces (MARFOR) land and establish bases in Mogadishu and Baldoa.

Phase II: MARFOR is joined by U.S. Army forces (ARFOR) and establish more bases at Belet Uen, Oddur, and Gialalassi.

Phase III: The area of operations is expanded to include Kismayo and Bardera.

Phase IV: The U.S. transfers control of the operation to the U.N.³

These phases were completed successfully. OPERATION RESTORE HOPE formally concluded on 4 May 1993 and was then transitioned to a U.N. effort, UNOSOM II. Continued conflict within Somalia would make UNOSOM II's efforts unsuccessful. U.N. forces would eventually withdraw

entirely from Somalia, but a discussion of UNOSOM II and the reasons for its operational failure are beyond the scope of this paper.

It is difficult to ascertain exactly how many NGOs existed in Somalia during OPERATION RESTORE HOPE. The absence of an effective central government meant that accurate, country-wide records were not kept. Furthermore many normal controls such as entry visas, country clearances, immigration checks and so forth were not in place. Military sources give differing numbers, as well as differing names, for NGOs operating on the ground.

It is possible that some of this confusion arises from NGOs which operate as offshoots of parent organizations with differing names. Doctors without Borders, USA (for example) is also known as *Medecins sans Frontieres*, USA and is affiliated with the world-wide *Medecins sans Frontieres* based in France. Different sources place all three of these organizations in Somalia, yet they could have been just as accurately counted as only one NGO in theater.

The Center for Naval Analysis lessons learned team which accompanied the personnel of OPERATION RESTORE HOPE attempted to compile accurate statistics. Their determination is that in December 1992 there were 23 NGOs operating in Somalia (21 international and two Somali), as well as two branches of the International Red Cross and six different U.N. agencies. In March 1993, after OPERATION RESTORE HOPE had moved into full swing, there were 52 NGOs operating (44 international and 8 Somali), as well as the aforementioned Red Cross and U.N. agencies.⁴ The sheer number of groups involved clearly illustrates the need for intentional coordinating mechanisms.

There were certain organizational characteristics of the NGOs themselves which made such coordination difficult. The CNA's Jonathan Dworken (who uses the term Humanitarian Relief Organization [HRO] to include both NGOs and U.N. agencies) notes that:

The [numbers] mask two important features of the HROs. First, due to the difficult and sometimes dangerous living and working conditions, many HROs came and left Somalia quickly. Others had a high turnover of personnel. Second, there was a great deal of antagonism and competition among different HROs. This lack of institutional memory and competition made the military's job of coordinating with HROs more difficult.⁵

Further complicating the command and control picture was the presence in Somalia of civilian agencies of the U.S. Government. In August 1992, significantly before the initiation of OPERATION RESTORE HOPE, President George Bush had appointed Andrew S. Natsios as his special envoy and the interagency coordinator for Somali relief.

Mr. Natsios, who as previously noted currently serves as the vice president of World Vision, was at that time employed by the State Department's Agency for International Development (USAID). USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has the capability to organize and deploy Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) to areas outside of the United States affected by either natural or man-made disasters. Three such teams were deployed to the Somalia relief effort; one in Mombassa and another in Nairobi--to assist in getting relief supplies to Somalia through Kenya, the third in Somalia itself.

USAID's strategy for relief in Somalia included five mission elements. These were: (a) emergency food airlifts, (b) market intervention to decrease food prices while increasing the quantity of food available, (c) provision of both food and non-food relief supplies,

(d) rehabilitation of the shattered Somali infrastructure, focusing especially on the livestock and agricultural sectors, and (e) Negotiating with the U.N. for U.N.-sponsored security guards throughout Somalia.⁶

The picture, then, for the U.S. military commander was complex. His threefold mission revolved occupying key terrain (ports and airfields), ensuring secure delivery of relief supplies, and "assisting" the NGOs. The mission as defined by the State Department was much broader, including elementary market reform, dealing with the U.N., and rebuilding selected aspects of the Somali infrastructure. Military forces of other nations were involved, whose lines of authority to the CJTF commander were blurry at best. The U.N. saw the CJTF as primarily a stabilizing operation bridging two U.N. missions, UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II. Finally, the NGOs themselves were not operating through any sort of unified coordinating agency. The C2 difficulties in this situation, even without taking into account the threat posed by the potentially hostile and definitely fragmented Somali forces in the area, are obvious.

The CJTF commander's initial response to this complexity was to divide southern Somalia into eight Humanitarian Relief Sectors (HRS). (A ninth HRS was added in March 1993.)⁷ Each HRS was based on a geographic area surrounding a major town. Occupation and control of the town itself gave the military forces in the HRS a staging base for the entire area which optimized the use of whatever infrastructure was available.

The use of the term "humanitarian relief sector" was an intentional attempt to avoid purely operational terminology (with its connotations of employing aggressive force). The term "HRS" was seen as emphasizing the humanitarian nature of this mission.⁸

Occupation of each HRS, when possible, was assigned to a particular nation or a single U.S. service component. This was possible in four out of nine HRS's. Canada, Italy, and France each occupied an HRS. The 10th Mountain Division occupied three: one alone, one in conjunction with Belgium, and the third in conjunction with Morocco. The Marine Corps occupied three (but none alone): one with Australia, another with India, and the lead responsibility for the Mogadishu HRS, with several coalition nations contributing additional forces within the city.

On the whole the HRS arrangement worked out well for the forces involved. It allowed for an organized, focused approach to operations throughout southern Somalia (although there is one instance where the Italians insisted on mounting an operation outside of their own HRS because the NGO which needed security and other support happened to be an Italian-based group).⁹ This type of occurrence, however, was rare and the HRS concept is viewed in general as a success by all military commentators.

The NGOs, however, were not quite as satisfied with certain aspects of this arrangement. As would be expected, the military commander in each HRS was given a wide degree of latitude on how to conduct operations within his area of responsibility. This led to differing policies and procedures from HRS to HRS. (A specific example

is weapons control and confiscation policies, which will be discussed more fully later.)

For those NGOs which operated in only one area this was no problem. Larger NGOs, however, which operated throughout Somalia, now had to deal with each commander's rules and regulations as they crossed from one HRS to another. They had become accustomed to dealing with the crazy-quilt patchwork of local clan-based warlords, it appeared to some of them that the military was acting in the same arbitrary fashion, albeit without the random violence which characterized many Somali factional armies.

The CJTF planners had known from the outset that military/NGO cooperation was necessary for successful completion of the operation. In the earlier, more limited, OPERATION PROVIDE RELIEF coordination had been accomplished between the military and NGOs through the creation of a Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC). The HOC is an organization made up of representatives from the military, civilian governmental agencies, and the NGOs who are present in a relief operation. In Somalia a nation-wide HOC was set up at U.N. headquarters in Mogadishu, and a "mini-HOC" was set up in each HRS.

It is important to note that the HOC is not a strictly military organization, either in scope or composition. It is a coordinating organization which serves the purpose of getting all of the major players in a humanitarian operation in one place to discuss issues which affect all of them. There is no standard table of organization for a HOC. Its composition and structure are totally situation-dependent.

In Somalia the countrywide HOC was directed by a U.N. official. There were two deputy directors, one civilian and one military. The civilian deputy director came from the USAID DART. The military deputy director was the former Chief of Staff of the JTF which conducted OPERATION PROVIDE RELIEF.¹⁰

The mission of the HOC was to plan, support, and monitor the delivery of relief supplies in Somalia. The HOC director felt that this could best be accomplished through close planning among the NGOs themselves and between the NGOs and the military. To accomplish this planning the HOC centered its efforts on three main functions:

(a) developing and implementing an overall relief strategy for Somalia, (b) Coordinating logistics support for HROs, and (c) arranging military support for HROs. These broad functions were dealt with by a Standing Liaison Committee (SLC) within the HOC. This committee had representatives from the major governmental and U.N. players, as well as the military. NGOs were represented by a representative executive committee. The SLC, on the whole, had little or no authority, serving only as a coordinating body.

The organizations of the eight additional "mini-HOCs" located in each HRS were similar, except that the level and number of representatives were lower, commensurate with their regional--rather than national--scope of operations. The nationwide HOC served concurrently as the mini-HOC for Mogadishu.

Within the military coordination with the NGOs was done through a (CMOC). The CMOC director was also the HOC military deputy director. The CMOC's most important function was to deal with NGO requests. These

requests mainly fell into the areas of convoy escorts, request for space-available air travel, various sorts of technical assistance, and security of personnel, equipment, or relief supplies. The CMOC also served as the military presence within the nation-wide HOC.

Military commands within each HRS set up HRS-level CMOCs. They were often more informal than the nationwide CMOC, but functionally they worked in the same way. Their mission was to serve as the military point of contact which coordinated and validated requests from NGOs for military assistance.

The formal organizational chain which an individual NGO had to use in order to request military assistance was actually somewhat complex. In theory a local NGO would first bring the request to the HRS-level HOC. After review, that HOC would forward it to the nationwide HOC. After review by that HOC, the request would be turned over to the CMOC. The CMOC, in turn, would validate the request and turn it over to tasking authorities within the military structure for assignment to a specific unit.

NGOs, unused to the nature of this hybrid civil-military bureaucracy, were naturally frustrated with certain aspects of it. Some military writers, Major Susan Sweatt for example, thinks that the whole system was unnecessarily complicated by the introduction of the "mini-HOC" layer.¹¹

Almost all writers, military and civilian, note that what really made the system work was the personalities involved on all sides, characterized by individuals who wanted the overall mission to succeed and made it happen. Also, as time progressed, NGOs and military sources

saw the advantages in increased local coordination. The number and nature of requests submitted to Mogadishu decreased significantly as local arrangements and understandings were worked out between military commanders and NGOs operating in their individual sectors.

What, then, did this geographical division of forces into HRS's and the organizational HOC/CMOC structure accomplish? What were the actual functional areas in which the military and NGOs interacted?

Basically there were five broad areas of interaction. The military worked directly with NGOs to aid relief efforts by: (a) escorting convoys, (b) providing security to NGO personnel, equipment, supplies, and facilities, (c) directly assisting NGOs in humanitarian and civic assistance projects, (d) providing technical assistance to such projects, and (e) confiscating weapons.¹² Each of these areas bears further examination; particularly (c), which illustrated cooperation which went well above and beyond the stated mission; and (e), which was the most contentious issue between the military and NGOs in OPERATION RESTORE HOPE.

Convoy security was the key to broadening relief efforts in Somalia. It was a task which the military was eminently suited to do, for essentially it was a standard military security mission. On the whole the NGOs used their own (or leased) trucks rather than military vehicles. Procedures for requesting convoy escort were extremely simple--a one page request sheet which could be submitted directly to the CMOC. All that was required was a 48-hour lead time.

Intermittent problems with coordination and link-up between NGO convoys and their military supporting forces is noted by some sources.

Periodic problems also occurred when convoys crossed HRS boundaries, particularly if there was to be a switch-off in the military units escorting the convoys. Still more problems occurred in regards to differing HRS policies concerning weapons carried by Somali guards employed by NGOs.

In the aggregate, however, these problems were extremely minor. Convoy escort was a huge, literally unparalleled, success. Almost 10,000 tons of food a month was being moved by February 1993; starvation had virtually been stopped throughout the country.¹³

NGOs asked for security against two threats. One threat was the roving gangs of bandits which plagued the country. The other was their own guards, who often were simply Mafia-like protection agents rather than genuine security guards.¹⁴

The CMOC set up an emergency notification system for the NGOs to contact when they were in trouble. This system augmented routine requests for security assistance, which went through normal CMOC/HOC channels. The military response time and the wide dispersion of NGO locations which could be potential targets for looters hindered the effectiveness of this emergency system.

Since the military, however, had no authority to order NGOs to abandon their existing dispersed facilities and concentrate in one area, and NGOs--even under threat--showed little inclination to do so, the system worked as well as could be expected. There were few complaints by NGOs about it.

The military provided direct assistance in NGOs in a wide range of projects. Little, if any, of this assistance was coordinated through

the HOC/CMOC structure. At times NGOs would request assistance directly from units with them in the field and the units would provide it. In other cases, "soldiers saw the [NGOs] trying to provide relief to the Somalis and the soldiers simply helped them."¹⁵

Sometimes this help took the form of purely manual labor. At other times military machinery was used to clear obstacles or assist in construction. The military often provided humanitarian and civic assistance directly to the Somalis or directly assisted NGOs in doing so. The military, as a whole, was proud of this and throughout the operation units were requested to forward reports of this type of activity for inclusion in USCENTCOM reports, briefings to VIPs, and so forth.

Commanders and soldiers on the ground were motivated to provide this type of assistance for several reasons. These include being impressed by the efforts of the NGOs to raise the extremely low Somali standard of living and simply wanting to help out, thinking that assisting the NGOs was part of their basic mission, and simply having spare time on their hands.

This type of initiative was incredibly beneficial to military/NGO interaction. The only problem with it came from within the Department of Defense itself. There are specific regulatory guidelines (based in Title 10 of the U.S. Code) governing the expenditure of operations and maintenance funds for humanitarian and civic assistance. The CJTF Staff Judge Advocate raised this issue within the CJTF command group. Field commanders argued that such activities did not violate

these guidelines, but were integral to the concept of the operation itself. The issue was not resolved by the end of the operation.¹⁶

Providing technical assistance was another matter. Requests for technical assistance usually were staffed through channels and could be reviewed at length before approval. When such requests were approved, they allowed the military to support NGOs with technical (often engineering) expertise for major projects. In some cases the military was also asked to support the project directly, in others merely to assist in studying and planning. The only problem noted in this area is that NGOs, at times, thought that the level and depth of military expertise was greater than it actually was. However, the military did its best and sent out numerous teams throughout the operation to support NGOs in these areas.¹⁷

The remaining area, weapons confiscation, was a highly contentious and negative area of military and NGO interaction. It is ironic that NGOs, who often have a reputation for resenting the military as makers of war, found themselves in such sharp conflict with the military over weapons carried by employees of the NGOs themselves. The situation, however, was complex--illustrating how perceptions can radically differ even between organizations operating in the same area with the common goals: the safety of their personnel and security for their relief convoys.

The Center for Naval Analysis report describes this tension as follows:

This situation was complex. The HROs needed to rent vehicles from Somalis to deliver relief supplies. Most vehicles came with drivers armed to protect them from bandits. The HROs needed to bring these vehicles into areas controlled by UNITAF (such as the

port and airfields) to receive relief supplies. To deliver supplies, they needed to cross HRS borders and pass through military checkpoints.

At the same time, however, UNITAF was trying to disarm the warlords. Some soldiers had difficulty telling bandits from Somali HRO drivers, and therefore confiscated any weapon they saw, including those belonging to HRO drivers. Other soldiers, convinced that the Somali HRO drivers took their weapons home in the evenings and became bandits, wanted to confiscate HRO weapons.

Without their weapons, the drivers would neither drive the vehicles nor allow other HRO workers to drive them without escorts. Therefore the HROs were paying for the vehicles to remain idle.¹⁸

Issues surrounding weapons confiscation policies were to remain as points of contention throughout the duration of the operation. Military authorities attempted to resolve these issues by use of identification cards, which could be issued to identify "legitimate" NGO employees. The first cards did not include the bearer's picture and therefore were never effective. The later ones were photographic identification cards and the problems diminished somewhat.

The problem was never really solved until UNITAF took direct control of policy throughout the country, issuing a policy card which superseded local command prerogatives and was applied uniformly throughout every HRS. Ironically, however, the problem was the most acute in Mogadishu itself. The reasons for this are many; security problems in general were greater in Mogadishu, the soldiers and Marines were not personally familiar with the HRO drivers like they were in smaller cities, and there were simply more checkpoints.

However, the greatest reason for the problems might lie in the nature of the HOC in Mogadishu. It was the "national" HOC, and therefore its CMOC was not manned by officers from the military units actually occupying Mogadishu (primarily U.S. Marines) but by officers from UNITAF. So, if a Marine confiscated a weapon a different

organization (UNITAF) had the problem of dealing with the angry NGO, rather than that Marine's own commander having the problem.

This may not fully explain the scope of the problem. However, Marines in other HRSs had vastly fewer problems with this weapons policy than those in Mogadishu. As the CNA report puts it, "In other towns it appeared that once the officers had to deal with the HROs, the military stopped confiscating their weapons. In [Mogadishu] MARFOR was insulated from the complaints."¹⁹

This particular issue was one characterized by conflict rather than cooperation. It seems, however, that when the entire operation is taken as a whole the interaction between the military and NGOs was satisfactory. The mission, as expressed in the basic mission order, was accomplished. The major ports and airfields were secured. Relief supplies were protected and escorted to their intended recipients. NGOs were given assistance in the accomplishment of their relief missions. There were problems, but in the end those problems were overcome by individuals in all of the organizations who worked for aims which they had in common: the alleviation of the suffering of a helpless people.

There were certainly military personnel who viewed the NGOs in a less-than-positive light. There were also NGO personnel who viewed the military in a less-than-positive light. However, OPERATION RESTORE HOPE proved that unity of effort between the military and NGOs can be attained. The unity was not perfect. Neither the military nor NGOs have ever been able to achieve perfect unity of effort even within their own camps. It is unrealistic to expect that they could do so between camps in the midst of a hazardous mission in an extreme emergency.

Their solution, however, was workable, and because of their unity of effort people lived who would have otherwise died.

The military was sent in to Somalia to support the NGOs. Although it is in the nature of any organization to want to put itself on "center stage," in this case the military needed to play a supporting role. Some commanders, at least, came to realize that in Somalia the military was supporting something good, right, and worth a great deal of effort. The official after-action report of the 10th Mountain Division shows this clearly and salutes the NGOs they supported.

Unlike many other military operations, not all the credit for the success of this operations can go to the support of military forces. Over forty-nine Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are the real heroes of this operation. These dedicated relief workers provided food, shelter, agricultural supplies, education, medicine, water and a whole host of other needs to the Somali people. . . . Many of them had been working in Somalia long before military operation was begun and will remain long after military forces redeploy.²⁰

Endnotes

¹The sequence of operations in Somalia which follows is compiled from CNA analysis papers, the "10th Mountain Division ARFOR After Action Report on Operation Restore Hope" (Fort Drum, New York: HQS, 10th Mountain Division, 1993), and various USMC Lessons Learned documents.

²John G. Summer, "Humanitarian Aid in Somalia: The Role of the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) 1990-1994" (Washington, D.C.: Refugee Policy Group, 1994), 13.

³Zvijac and McGrady, 10.

⁴Dworken, 26.

⁵Dworken, 7.

⁶Summer, 6.

⁷10 Mountain AAR, 47.

⁸Ibid., 8.

⁹Ibid., 48.

¹⁰The discussion of the HOC which follows is taken from both of the already-cited CNA papers, by Dworken and Zvijac and McGrady.

¹¹Sweatt, 19.

¹²Dworken, 31.

¹³10 Mountain Division AAR, 12.

¹⁴Dworken, 24-25.

¹⁵Dworken, 20.

¹⁶See Dworken, 25-28. Interestingly enough, the senior JAG officer on the ground, COL F.W. Lorenz, USMC, does not discuss these issues in his numerous professional articles on the operation.

¹⁷Dworken, 28.

¹⁸Dworken, 29; and Sweatt, 6, 10-11.

¹⁹Dworken, 33.

²⁰10 Mountain Division AAR, 2.

CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS
FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Conclusions

The complex nature of the interaction between the military and NGOs has been clearly illustrated in the previous case study and the organizational analysis which preceded it. Within the midst of this complexity, however, several conclusions stand out.

The first conclusion answers the primary research question concerning the basic nature of the interaction between the military and NGOs. This conclusion may be stated as follows: Military organizations view and deal with NGOs as an external environmental factor; NGOs also view and deal with the military as an external environmental factor.

This conclusion could be seen as a statement of the obvious. It is not. The military perspective on the importance of command and control leads commanders towards wanting to *internalize* NGOs when they are present in MOOTW, to co-opt them as part of the military's mission. Major John Metz was correct when he clearly defined NGOs as intrinsically part of the external or task environment in MOOTWs, but others do not share this conceptual understanding.¹ Military writers in this area often speak in soft terms such as unity of effort and coordination. The military's basic unstated assumption, however, is

that clear command and control is better than voluntary cooperation. This assumption informs many military attitudes about NGOs.

Direct military command and control over NGOs, however, is not possible because of the statutory differences in the organizations. The two types of organizations do not spring from the same source, and except in certain very limited circumstances there is not, and will not be, any legal basis for direct military control of NGOs. NGOs, therefore, will always be an external factor--something to be dealt with rather than commanded--to the military organization.

The converse is also true. The military will also never be internal to the NGO effort and will always remain an external factor. NGOs, on the whole, have less of a problem with the concept than the military does. They are, by their nature, used to dealing with governmental agencies as a part of their external environment--that is implicit in their role as nongovernmental agencies.

In OPERATION RESTORE HOPE, however, the expectations of some NGOs blurred this understanding to a certain degree. These NGOs internalized the military to their organizational mission, tending to assume that the role of the military was to be at their beck and call. (They also often thought that the military could meet any need, and resented being told otherwise.²) This was not a major problem. It does illustrate the phenomenon that NGOs, although often resisting involvement with the military, can also move to the opposite extreme and attempt to co-opt the military to entirely to their own organizational ends.

Attempts to do this run into the same blocking factors as do attempts by the military to directly control NGOs. The source of (U.S.) military authority is the Constitution and Federal Law, which do not allow for non-governmental civilians to exercise command and control over military forces. NGOs in Somalia did, to a limited extent, employ armed security guards and drivers. In that sense they could be seen as directing or commanding an (extremely limited) armed force. Those employees, however, were not members of the military organizations of sovereign nations. NGOs will have to deal with sovereign military forces during humanitarian emergencies--and they will deal with them as external, rather than internal, factors.

The second conclusion derived from this study is that there will always be conflict in the interaction between NGOs and the military.

There are two reason for this inevitable conflict. The first lies in the differences between the basic unstated assumptions of the two groups. The second lies in a genuine, not merely perceptual, difference in their ultimate values and organizational goals.

As was discussed in chapter 4, the military and the NGOs both have basic unstated assumptions which guide their organizational culture and behavior. Some of these conflict with one another. One clear example would be the military's basic unstated assumption that control is good and the NGOs' basic unstated assumption that organizational independence is vital.

If these conflict, could not these organizations alter those basic unstated assumptions for the sake of cooperation? Schein would seem to argue that changes in such basic assumptions are extremely

difficult for organizations to make without altering the character of the organization itself.³ Is this issue worth the cost of significant organizational change to either the military or to NGOs?

The answer to this question is probably no. It is important to realize that the very characteristics which make the interaction between the military and NGOs difficult serve both organizations well in other settings. The absolutely vital role of discipline and clear command and control in combat is unquestioned. NGOs have operated effectively in many and varied situations throughout the world precisely because of their willingness to focus on their independent organizational objectives in the midst of endlessly competing demands.

The issue of cooperation with the military is becoming increasingly important to NGOs. The issue of cooperation with NGOs is likewise important to the military. Neither organization, however, stands or falls on the issue of whether that cooperation is perfect, or conflict is entirely absent. Hence it is extremely unlikely that they will change their basic underlying assumptions simply for the sake of greater cooperation.

The military has made some doctrinal changes to accommodate situations where NGOs are present, such as adoption of the CMOC concept. NGOs have also adjusted to the military's presence. They participate HOCs, often seek out further opportunities for interagency training with the military,⁴ and are now attempting to systematize their institutional memory concerning interaction with the military in humanitarian emergencies through such agencies as the Refugee Policy Group in Washington, DC.⁵

The bottom line, however, is that differing basic underlying assumptions will remain and therefore conflict will continue to be a characteristic of the interaction between NGOs and the military.

A second (and this author would argue deeper) reason for the inevitability of this conflict (at least in certain situations) is that the ultimate values and ends of the U.S. military and NGOs lie in different places. Ultimately the U.S. military exists to serve this Nation. The military is employed by the Nation (in the person of the NCA) to serve national interests. When those interests are no longer sufficient to warrant the continued presence of the military, again as determined by the NCA, the military will be withdrawn.

NGOs enter a region to serve the people of that region, within the parameters and value system of their organization. Their ultimate goal is to serve the people of the nation where they work. It is not to serve the national interest of the United States. They withdraw when the job is finished, or--at times--when conditions are too dangerous to remain. They often take a great deal of pride in having the "long view" about humanitarian assistance in their areas of operation.

The bottom line here is that if the NCA decides that it is in the national interests of the United States to enter a region the military will do so, regardless of the perspectives of NGOs in the area. Likewise if the NCA decides it is in the national interests of the United States for the military to withdraw it will do so, regardless of the perspectives of the NGOs.

Conversely, if the NGOs feel that the military is taking a wrong approach they will see no need to act in the role of "team players."

They will not a program simply to demonstrate unity of effort--their commitment is to the people, not to a government, system, or specific program.

These ends do not always conflict in the real world. In Somalia, for instance, the overall attitude of NGOs was to approve of the military presence.⁶ The potential for tension is always there, however, and it is a tension which no amount of organizational adjustment will be sufficient to overcome.

The third conclusion is that the amount of conflict in the interaction between the military and NGOs in a MOOTW situation will depend in large part on the military's understanding of its own mission.

If the military clearly understands its own mission parameters, then it can articulate those parameters from the outset of a MOOTW to both NGOs and the public. There will then be fewer unmet expectations which could lead to further conflict. If, on the other hand, those parameters are unclear or are not articulated, then both the NGOs and the public can be misled about military capabilities and intentions. Organizational conflict, often played out in the media, will be the inevitable result.

Both the Center for Naval Analysis and the AAR of the 10th Mountain Division emphasize a lack of mission clarity going in OPERATION RESTORE HOPE. The CNA report goes on to explore how this lack of clarity affected military and NGO relations in the area of security. The military clearly has a need to protect itself and maintain security. If it does so by means which deprive NGOs of their own security, is it the obligation or proper role of the military to replace the security

which they have taken away? Military commanders in OPERATION RESTORE HOPE were split in their opinions. In fact, these same commanders were divided over the entire issue of just what their mission guidance to "support the NGOs" actually meant. The Secretary of Defense, who issued this guidance, never clarified his mission intent. Commanders on the ground just had to work it out for themselves.⁷

The final conclusion is that current military doctrine is correctly addressing many of the problems identified in reviews of recent missions involving military/NGO interaction. This study, therefore, supports the general direction of current military doctrinal development in this arena. This is particularly true in regards to the creation of the CMOC as a single, focused point of contact for NGOs to use when dealing with the military. The existence of such an entity plays on strengths of the military (organizational discipline and the ability to focus on tangible missions) while minimizing the need for the military and NGOs to interact in areas where they may not or cannot agree (like long-term goals or end states). The military and NGOs each bring unique cards to the MOOTW table. The CMOC simply provides a neutral place for each player to lay these cards out.

The author has specific recommendations concerning the composition and control of the CMOC (see below). These recommendations, however, should be viewed as falling within the general outlines of current doctrinal initiatives rather than challenging the validity of them. The important issue is to have a specified point of contact between the military and NGOs so that tensions between the organizations are not magnified by the frustration of not knowing with whom to talk.

Recommendations

Recommendation 1. Training opportunities between NGOs and the military should be expanded.

Military and civilian sources alike cite this as an important need.⁶ Experiences where it has been done, both in the United States on a limited basis and in Austria, which has held at least one full-blown humanitarian exercise, have been extremely positive.⁹

The value in these exercises lies beyond simply getting military personnel used to working with NGO personnel and problems. The exercises are equally valuable for the NGO personnel involved, giving them "hands on" exposure to the military. For this reason the practice of using military personnel in civilian clothing to represent "notional" NGOs should be avoided if at all possible.

Recommendation 2. The CMOC should be expanded to include a chaplain, public affairs officer, and a legal officer.

The military chaplaincy consists of clergy who, by law, must maintain a formal professional relationship with their religious organizations. These officers are, therefore, the sole group of uniformed military personnel who have official roots and status in both the military and the religious communities from which many NGOs come.

Additionally, NGO personnel often have a certain amount of inherent trust in the military chaplain because of their perceptions of what being a clergyman (or clergywoman) means in terms of personal values and integrity. Furthermore, many chaplains share to a certain extent in the organizational cultures--at all three levels--of both the military and generally altruistic organizations akin to that of NGOs.

In his analysis of the role of chaplains in Somalia Chaplain (Colonel) Gary Councell notes that when circumstances became particularly difficult that chaplains were sought after and had no problems dealing with NGOs.¹⁰

Most chaplains, except those assigned to Civil Affairs units as Cultural Affairs Specialists, do not have specialized backgrounds or receive any training in civil-military relations. These lacks, however, hold true for many personnel assigned to CMOCs. A more significant problem would probably be the conflict between assigning a chaplain to this role and providing pastoral coverage for the military personnel carrying out the MOOTW--chaplains are often in short supply throughout the force. It would seem, however, that the inherent trust level of many NGOs for the members of the clergy, combined with the ability of the chaplain to bridge two organizational cultures, makes chaplains essential additions to CMOCs.

A Public Affairs Officer (PAO) should be assigned to the CMOC because it is a key place for positive publicity about the military. The need of NGOs for constant publicity has already been discussed. Likewise the military commander has a need to tell a positive story to the public. Being present at the CMOC would allow a skilled PAO to survey on-going missions from the very beginning. The PAO would then have the opportunity to work in cooperation with the NGOs to insure media coverage of key missions. This coverage would simultaneously benefit the NGOs, the military command, and the media organizations themselves. If done correctly this would be a "win-win-win" situation for all concerned.

The legal presence (JAG) at the CMOC might be provided on an "as needed" basis rather than by a full-time CMOC member. The complexity of the rules and regulations which apply to humanitarian assistance, however; and the need to comply with U.S., international, and at times host-nation law calls for something more intentional than a staff JAG officer who reviews issues as they cross his desk elsewhere.

It is apparent that command decisions in humanitarian operations may often be in legal "gray" areas. This was certainly the case in Somalia, as was noted in the last chapter when direct humanitarian assistance activities by local commanders were discussed. Continual legal presence at the CMOC will insure that on the one hand commanders are advised when genuine legal problems may exist, but on the other hand that JAG personnel involved in that determination are fully aware of the context of the proposed missions they are reviewing.

Recommendation 3. The CMOC should either be a sub-element of the G-3 (Operations) Section, or report directly to the commander. It should not be placed within the Civil Affairs (CA) section.

In a MOOTW the role of the CMOC is critical. It coordinates support for organizations who are essential to the success of the mission. The amount of time and energy which the commander will have to give to issues involving NGOs is in inverse proportion to the violence level of the situation. Never, however, will that commander be able to neglect NGOs entirely.

In a low-threat environment it may be advisable for the CMOC to fall directly under the commander. In such cases support for NGOs is

likely to be the "hottest game in town," and the commander will want to exercise close, personal control over military/NGO issues.

In higher threat environments the needs of NGOs will fall in areas where the G-3's resources will be needed, such as personnel for security duty. The commander's attention will also be focused on force protection and countering the military threat. In these cases it makes more sense for the CMOC to fall under the umbrella of the G-3, which has the capability at hand to respond to NGOs effectively within the context of the total military mission.

Joint Civil Affairs doctrine assigns CA units the mission of "support[ing] and coordinating civil-military operations, such as humanitarian and disaster relief."¹¹ However CA is not given the responsibility for operating CMOCs in either Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, or the interservice publication Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations.

It is obvious that CA has an extremely valid interest and concern for the interaction between the military and NGOs. That concern, however, should not lead to initiatives making control of the CMOC a CA function. (This is different issue from having CA personnel operating a CMOC which falls into one of the staff relationships recommended above. At times this might be highly desirable, particularly since CA units often have special staff assets which could be used in accordance with the preceding recommendations.) CA, properly done, focuses directly on the civilian and host-nation affairs in an

area of operation. The CMOC, properly run, focuses directly on NGOs and only indirectly (if at all) on civilians or host-nation concerns.

This difference in focus, combined with the need for close command attention to NGO issues and the extreme scarcity of active duty CA assets¹² speaks against CA control of the CMOC in any setting; but particularly against it in MOOTWs where--at best--only a small number of CA Reservists will be present.

Recommendation 4. The military should establish a formal training program, and a tracking mechanism for those so trained, in military/NGO operations.

In the Army this would involve assigning proponentcy for such training to a specific branch or school, developing the training criteria and standards, creating and resourcing a training program to meet these standards, and creating an Additional Skill Indicator (ASI) or other mechanism for tracking those who have been trained.

The intent, of course, would be to attempt to use these personnel in CMOCs as they are stood up. It is quite probable that this training could be done primarily, or even entirely, on a non-resident basis. The Psychological Operations Course, which has been taught for nearly thirty years by correspondence, (originally through the U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance [now the JFK Special Warfare School] at Fort Bragg and more recently as part of the Army Correspondence Course Program [ACCP]) might serve as a model.¹³

Recommendation 5. The military should second selected officers to NGOs to observe their operations and cultivate deeper organizational relationships.

This would have to be done on an extremely selective basis due to the cost involved. The International Committee of the Red Cross accepts a limited number of officers from traditionally neutral nations such as Sweden and Switzerland. Some of the larger U.S.-based NGOs, such as CARE, World Vision, or the American Red Cross might be willing to do the same for U.S. officers.

The model for this program could parallel the Training with Industry (TWI) program which is currently used in the logistics field to temporarily second selected U.S. officers to major corporations. Those officers obtain skills and managerial insights throughout their year in the program, the firms involved gain a better picture of junior and mid-range military professionals. The key to such a program with NGOs would be to recoup the cost through some very intentional follow-on assignments in the policy-making or planning areas of either an individual service, unified command, or the Joint Staff.

Recommendation 6. The military should maintain a current data base on NGOs, including those organizational characteristics which would be helpful to ground commanders and any specific lessons learned in dealing with the NGO in the past.

The State Department (OFDA) currently maintains a data base on NGOs which military organizations can access. InterAction, a major NGO umbrella group, also maintains a data base on NGOs which is open to anyone, governmental or otherwise.

Neither of these data bases is specifically oriented towards military needs, which tend to focus on concrete concerns about interacting with specific groups on the ground. The military should

fill this need by assigning responsibility for collecting this information to one organization and resourcing that organization to fulfill the mission. That organization would then set up reporting procedures (or piggy-back on existing reporting procedures), collect information, and disseminate it as needed to "customers" throughout the military.

Recommendation 7. The military should include information on NGOs which are present in the area of operations in the "Soldiers Books" given to troops when they deploy on MOOTWs.

NGOs are a significant factor in that operation, yet this type of information is not included in such booklets.¹⁴ A short description of the three or four major NGOs in an area, their organizational roots, structure, mission, and visible "artifacts" (such as their logo) would be sufficient.

As one writer put it, "If they can get me pictures of tanks, how come I can't show my soldiers what a CARE truck looks like?"¹⁵ Including this information in these booklets, which to most soldiers are the official "word" of their commanders, would help legitimize the roles and missions of NGOs to the troops on the ground.

Areas for Further Research

There are five areas where further research might, in the opinion of this author, add a significant knowledge to this field. The constraints of time and the limited scope of this study precluded their investigation in this paper.

1. Is the nature of the interaction between non-U.S. military forces and NGOs similar to that of U.S. military and NGO interaction?

Limited material is readily available concerning experiences of British and French forces.¹⁶ Of particular interest might be the experience of the Irish or Indian armed forces. They both have been involved in many humanitarian operations. The Irish nation has an official, State Church (Roman Catholic). The Indians operate from a non-Judeo-Christian cultural heritage. Do these factors affect their relationship with NGOs? If so, in what way?

2. How does the NGO community characterize the support from and interaction with military forces in Rwanda? From the U.S. military perspective OPERATION SUPPORT HOPE is generally seen as a resounding success.¹⁷ The Refugee Policy Group is currently finalizing a report, commissioned and funded by several major NGOs, on this operation. It should be available for review by September 1996.¹⁸

3. What is the nature of the military interaction with NGOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina? The scope of this operation, which exceeds even that of Somalia, and the fact that there are hundreds of NGOs which the State Department has identified on the ground, means that it will be a major testing ground for U.S. doctrine in this area.

4. Are there other analytical models of organizations or organizational culture which would lead to different conclusions about the organizational differences between NGOs and the military? Dr. Schein's work is only one of many possible approaches. This author's conclusion is that his work is both representative in its place within other analytical models of organizations and a valid tool to apply to

these two organizations. Are there other models which can be applied which would produce differing results?

5. What would a military training program on military and NGO interaction consist of? What would constitute a valid training plan? How could it be objectively validated, or by whom? What sort of feedback mechanisms could be created to review the performance of those receiving this training in the field?

The importance of this field will increase, rather than diminish over time. The author's hope is that this present study will be seen as neither conclusive nor confusing!--but rather as one strand in a developing cord which links two dissimilar organizations, each with eminently worthy ends, in the common purpose of serving those in need.

Endnotes

¹Metz, 26-29

²Dworken, 39

³Schein, 313-333

⁴See "InterAction's NGO After-Action Review of JRTC Exercise in Peace Enforcement" (InterAction, November 1993) for examples of training objectives which NGOs would like to accomplish with the military.

⁵The author was briefed on this effort when conversing with officials of the United Methodist Committee on Relief in March 1996.

⁶There were exceptions. See the AFRICAWATCH report in the U.S. Army peacekeeping JEMMS as an example.

⁷See Dworken, 36-37; 10 Mountain AAR (passim); and Sweatt, 4-5.

⁸For military examples see the Center for Naval Analysis reports. For a civilian example see the "NGO After Action Review of the JRTC Peace Enforcement Exercise" and the USAID "Conference Report on Improving Coordination of Humanitarian and Military Operations" (June 1994).

⁹Again, the NGO after action review on JRTC supports this. For more details on the Austrian experience see the after action report by the Austrian Armed Forces Disaster Relief Unit, "The Role of the Military in International Disaster Relief, List of Problems," (Headquarters, Austrian Armed Forces: undated).

¹⁰Council, 46.

¹¹Joint Publication 3-57, Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs, (Washington, D.C.: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 1991), II-6.

¹²Ibid., F-1 - F-4. According to this publication over 95% of Army CA assets are in the reserve components. The Navy and Air Force do not maintain CA units in their active or reserve components, and the USMC maintains CA assets only in the Marine Corps Reserve.

¹³The author completed this course in 1974 when it was still handled directly by (the then) United States Army Institute for Military Assistance (now the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center) and took a follow-up in 1986 when it had fallen under the Army Correspondence Course Program.

¹⁴The author has reviewed the handbooks for Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti. NGO information is not present in any of them. Other writers have also made this complaint, although it is not mentioned in either the 10th Mountain or USMC AARs from OPERATION RESTORE HOPE.

¹⁵From the "French and British Peace Operations Lessons Learned: Initial Impressions Report," (Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1995).

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷LTG Daniel Schroeder's already noted article, "Lessons of Rwanda: Joint Warfighting Doctrine Works in Operations Other Than War," is just one example of this conclusion.

¹⁸Per my conversation with that group in March 1996.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

- Allard, Kenneth. Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned. Fort McNair, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995.
- Benthall, Jonathan. Disasters, Relief, and the Media. London: I.B. Tauris & Co., Ltd., 1993.
- Cahill, Kevin M. A Framework for Survival: Health, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Assistance in Conflicts and Disasters. New York: Basic Books and the Council on Foreign Relations, 1993.
- _____. Somalia: A Perspective. Albany, NY: The State University of New York Press, 1980.
- Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, "Charter of Paris for a New Europe." In Alternative Conventional Defense Postures in the European Theater, Vol. 3: Force Posture Alternatives for Europe After the Cold War, Hans G. Brauch and Robert Kennedy, eds. Washington, DC: Crane Russak, 1993.
- De St. Joore, John. The Nigerian Civil War. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1972.
- Duell, Charles B. and Laaurel A. Dutcher. Working Together: NGO Cooperation in Seven African Countries. Washington, DC: American Council for Voluntary International Action, 1987.
- Hancock, Graham. Lords of Poverty: The Power, Prestige, and Corruption of the International Aid Business. New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1989.
- Harris, Philip R.; Simons, George F.; and Vazquez, Carmen. Transcultural Leadership: Empowering the Diverse Workforce. Managing Cultural Differences Series. Houston: Gulf Publishing Company, 1993.
- InterAction. InterAction Member Profiles 1993. Washington, DC: American Council for Voluntary International Action, 1993.
- Makinda, Samuel M. Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993.
- Naylor, Harriet H. Volunteers Today: Finding, Training and Working With Them. Dryden, NY: Dryden Associates, 1973.

Office of Military Leadership, United States Military Academy, eds.
A Study of Organizational Leadership. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole
Books, 1976.

Scheier, Ivan H. Exploring Volunteer Space: The Recruiting of a
Nation. Boulder, CO: The National Center for Citizen
Involvement, 1980.

_____. Winning With Staff: A New Look for Staff Support of
Volunteers. Boulder, CO: National Information Center on
Volunteerism, 1978.

Schein, Edgar H. Organizational Culture and Leadership. The Jossey-
Bass Management Series. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers,
1992.

Shaara, Michael. The Killer Angels. New York: Ballentine Books, 1974

Stoll, David. Is Latin America Turning Protestant? Berkeley: The
University of California Press, 1990.

Stremlau, Joseph. The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil
War. New York: Basic Books, 1979.

Thompson, Joseph E. American Policy and African Famine: The Nigeria-
Biafra War, 1966-1970. New York: Greenwood Press, 1990.

Turabian, Kate L. A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses, and
Dissertations. 5th ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987

Waite, Terry. Taken on Trust. New York: Harcourt, Brace, & Company,
1993.

Weiss, Thomas G., ed. Humanitarian Emergencies and Military Help in
Africa. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990.

Dissertations, Papers, and Theses

Blechman, Narry M. and J. Matthew Vaccaro, "Training for Peacekeeping:
The United Nations' Role." Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson
Center, 1994.

Brenneman, Leland, John Carroll, Jr., Elizabeth Dyer, Lauren Landis-
Guzman, Elizabeth Luksavich, Sam Toussie, and Roy Williams. "NGO
After Action Review of JRTC Exercise in Peace Enforcement."
Washington, DC: Interaction, 1993.

Clair, Carol D. "Humanitarian Assistance and the Elements of
Operational Design." Monograph, School of Advanced Military
Studies, USACGSC, 1993.

Collins, Carole C. and John G. Summer. "Humanitarian Aid in Somalia:
The Role of the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)
1990-1994." Washington, DC: Refugee Policy Group, 1994.

- Daze, Thomas. "Review and Analysis of UNOSOM II Operations." Published by USACGSC as Appendix 4 to Advance Sheet, Lesson 6, Course C510. Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, 1995.
- Dworken, Jonathan T. "Military Relations with Humanitarian Relief Organizations: Observations from Restore Hope." Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, 1993.
- Easton, Roger C. Jr. "Somalia: Key Operational Considerations and Implications in an Era of Peace-Enforcement and Forced Humanitarian Assistance Ventures." Monograph, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 1993.
- Hamilton, Raymond A. II. Machiavellianism and Its Relation to Leader Perception Among Career Air Force Officers. Doctor of Public Administration Dissertation, University of Alabama, 1990.
- McGrady, Katherine A.W. and David J. Zvijac. Operation Restore Hope: Summary Report. Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, 1994.
- Malone, John D., Truman W. Sharp, and Ray Yip. "US Military Forces and Emergency International Humanitarian Assistance: Observations and Recommendations from Three Recent Missions." Bethesda, MD: Naval Medical Research Institute, 1994.
- Marshall, William J. III. "By Separate Action: Humanitarian Assistance." Monograph, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 1993.
- Metz, John M. "Humanitarian Assistance Operations: A Command and Control Dilemma." MMAS Thesis, USACGSC, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1995.
- Metz, Steven. "Disaster and Intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa: Learning from Rwanda." Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1994.
- Pope, Thomas G. "Beans, Bullets, & Band-Aids: Attaining Unity of Effort in Humanitarian Intervention Operations." Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, USACGSC, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1994.
- Sutton, Ernest L. "The New Role of Humanitarian Assistance in National Military Strategy: How to Make It Work." Monograph, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1992.
- Sweatt, Susan G. "The Challenges of Civil-Military Relations at the Trailing Edge of War." Monograph, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 1995.

Journal and Magazine Articles

- Arnold, S. L. "Somalia: An Operation Other Than War." Military Review LXXIII, no. 12 (December 1993): 26-35.
- Bilbray, James H., and Henk Vos. "Peacekeeping and the New International Environment." The Officer, June 1995, 41-46.

- Bolton, Stephen, Michele Ritchie Roberts, and Alexander C. Wetzel.
 "Logistics Lessons from Somalia." Army Logistician, September-October 1994, 2-5.
- Gaddis, Evan R. "Leadership Versatility for Operations Other Than War."
Field Artillery, June 1994, 12-14.
- Harper, Gilbert S. "Operations Other than War: Leading Soldiers in
 Operation Restore Hope." Military Review LXXIII, no. 9 (September
 1993): 77-79.
- Hoar, Joseph P. "A CINC's Perspective." Joint Force Quarterly 2
 (September 1995): 56-63.
- Joulwan, George A. "Operations Other than War: A CINC's Perspective."
Military Review LXXIV, no. 2 (February, 1994): 5-10.
- Journal of the Society of Logistics Engineers. "Private Relief
 Agencies, Meeting Needs with Limited Resources." Logistics
 Spectrum 28, no. 4 (Fall 1994): 42
- Lorenz, F.M. "Law and Anarchy in Somalia." Parameters XXIII, 4
 (Winter 1993-94): 27-41.
- Nastsios, Andrew S. "Food Through Force: Humanitarian Intervention and
 U.S. Policy." The Washington Quarterly 17, no. 1 (Winter 1994):
 129-144.
- Oakley, Robert B. "An Envoy's Perspective." Joint Force Quarterly 2
 (September 1993): 44-55.
- Schroeder, Daniel J. "Lessons of Rwanda: Joint Warfighting Doctrine
 Works in Operations Other Than War." Armed Forces Journal
 International (December 1994): 31-33.
- Sihra, Balbeer K. "Relief Agencies and the U.S. Military: Partners in
 Humanitarian Operations." Marine Corps Gazette, March 1994, 13.
- Simpson, Keith. "Frock Coats, Mandarins, and Brass Hats: The Relation-
 ship between Politicians, Civil Servants, and the Military." RUSI
 Journal 137, no. 1 (February 1992): 57-63.
- Stanton, Martin N. "Letter from Somalia: An S-3's Observations."
Infantry (January-February 1995): 13-14
- Wright, Walter E. "Civil Affairs Support in Operations Other Than
 War." Military Review LXXIII, no. 10 (October 1993): 27-33.

Official Publications

- Center for Army Lessons Learned. French and British Peace Operations:
 Lessons Learned (Initial Impressions Report). Fort Leavenworth,
 KS: CALL, 1995.
- Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 1-05. Religious
 Ministry Support for Joint Operations. Baltimore: U.S. Government
 Printing Office, 1993.

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-0. Doctrine for Joint Operations. Baltimore: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993.

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-07, Draft. Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War. Baltimore: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995.

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations. Baltimore: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994.

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-08, First Draft. Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations. Baltimore: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995.

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-57, Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs. Baltimore: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991.

Department of the Army. U.S. Army Field Manual 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations. Baltimore: United States Government Printing Office, 1993.

Department of the Army. U.S. Army Field Manual 100-1, The Army. Baltimore: United States Government Printing Office, 1994.

Department of the Army. U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations. Baltimore: United States Government Printing Office, 1993.

Department of the Army. U.S. Army Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations. Baltimore: United States Government Printing Office, 1994.

Department of the Army. U.S. Army Field Manual 100-23-2, Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations. Fort Monroe, VA: Air, Land, Sea Application Center, 1994.

Department of Defense. Haiti Information Handbook. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1994.

_____. Operation Support Hope: Country Information Handbook. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1994.

_____. Directive 2205.2, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Provided in Conjunction with Military Operations. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1994.

Headquarters, 10th Mountain Division. ARFOR After Action Report for Operation Restore Hope. Fort Drumm, NY: HQS, 10th Mountain Division, 1993.

Headquarters, United States European Command. JTF Help List. Stuttgart, Germany: HQS, USEUCOM, 1993.

Joint Warfighting Center. Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations. Fort Monroe, VA: Joint Warfighting Center, 1995.

United Nations Resolution 688 (1991)

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Student Text 20-10.
Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) Research and Thesis.
Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, 1995.

U.S. Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center. Restore Hope,
Socaliinta Rajada, Soldier Handbook. Headquarters, U.S. Army
Intelligence and Security Command, 1992.

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research.
Conference Report: Improving Coordination of Humanitarian and
Military Operations. Washington, D.C.: Meridian International
Center, 1994.

United States Mission to the United Nations. Global Humanitarian
Emergencies, 1995.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Combined Arms Research Library
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900
2. Defense Technical Information Center
Cameron Station
Alexandria, VA 22314
3. Chaplain (Lieutenant Colonel) Edward K. Maney
DJCO
USACGSC
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900
4. Lieutenant Colonel Jose L. Vazquez
LID
USACGSC
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027
5. Major Michael R. Payne
5977 Horizon Heights
Kalamazoo, MI 49009

CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

1. Certification Date: 5 / 6 / 96
2. Thesis Author: Chaplain (MAJ) Lindsey E. Arnold
3. Thesis Title: Cooperation or Conflict: The Interaction of U.S. Military Forces and Non-Governmental Organizations in Military Operations Other Than War

4. Thesis Committee Members Signatures:

Edward K. Mancy

5. Distribution Statement: See distribution statements A-X on reverse, then circle appropriate distribution statement letter code below:

(A) B C D E F X SEE EXPLANATION OF CODES ON REVERSE

If your thesis does not fit into any of the above categories or is classified, you must coordinate with the classified section at CARL.

6. Justification: Justification is required for any distribution other than described in Distribution on Statement A. All or part of a thesis may justify distribution limitation. See limitation justification statements 1-10 on reverse, then list, below, the statement(s) that applies (apply) to your thesis and corresponding chapters/sections and pages. Follow the example format show below:

EXAMPLE

<u>Limitation Justification Statement</u>	<u>/</u>	<u>Chapter/Section</u>	<u>/</u>	<u>Page(s)</u>
Direct Military Support (10)	/	Chapter 3	/	12
Critical Technology (3)	/	Sect. 4	/	31
Administrative Operational Use (7)	/	Chapter 2	/	13-32

Fill in limitation justification for your thesis below:

<u>Limitation Justification Statement</u>	<u>Chapter/Section</u>	<u>Page(s)</u>
---	------------------------	----------------

	/	/
	/	/
	/	/
	/	/

7. MMAS Thesis Author's Signature:

Lindsey E. Arnold

STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
(Documents with this statement may be made available or sold to the general public and foreign nationals).

STATEMENT B: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only (insert reason and date ON REVERSE OF THIS FORM). Currently used reasons for imposing this statement include the following:

1. Foreign Government Information. Protection of foreign information.
2. Proprietary Information. Protection of proprietary information not owned by the U.S. Government.
3. Critical Technology. Protection and control of critical technology including technical data with potential military application.
4. Test and Evaluation. Protection of test and evaluation of commercial production or military hardware.
5. Contractor Performance Evaluation. Protection of information involving contractor performance evaluation.
6. Premature Dissemination. Protection of information involving systems or hardware from premature dissemination.
7. Administrative/Operational Use. Protection of information involving restricted to official use or for administrative or operational purposes.
8. Software Documentation. Protection of software documentation-- release only in accordance with the provisions of DoD Instruction 7930.2.
9. Specific Authority: Protection of information required by a specific authority.
10. Direct Military Support. To protect export-controlled technical data of such military significance that release for purposes other than direct support of DoD-approved activities may jeopardize a U.S. military advantage.

STATEMENT C: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors: (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above.

STATEMENT D: Distribution authorized to DoD and U.S. DoD contractors only: (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above.

STATEMENT E: Distribution authorized to DoD only; (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10.

STATEMENT F: Further dissemination only as directed by (controlling DoD office and date), or higher DoD authority. Used when the DoD originator determines that information is subject to special dissemination limitation specified by paragraph 4-505, DoD 5200.1-R.

STATEMENT X: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and private individuals of enterprises eligible to obtain export-controlled technical data in accordance with DoD Directive 5230.25; (date). Controlling DoD office is (insert).